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ABSTRACT 
This study tests the central concept that identity is a protected value. More specifically, 
the purpose of the proposed research is to assess how people process conflicts between identity 
and risk when making medical decisions, especially in regard to how people trade (or refuse to 
trade) protected values such as gender identity (i.e., an enduring sense of self as a man or a 
woman or some combination thereof) against important risks, such as those encountered in 
identity-relevant surgeries (e.g., sex reassignment surgery, prostatectomy, and mastectomy).  
Gender congruent males (N=187), gender congruent females (N=471), and transgender 
men (N=229) participated in an online study of how people process conflicts between identity 
and risk. Participants were randomized into a control condition, a standard dual process 
condition, or a fuzzy-trace theory condition. Across four medical scenarios, participants were 
asked to choose between an identity preserving option that was paired with a higher risk outcome 
and an identity threatening option that was paired with a lower risk option. Then participants 
completed a questionnaire assessing gender identity, personal values, and basic demographics. 
Gender identity was measured using personal report and validated using the Hoffman Gender 
Scale. Personal values were scored on a 10-point Likert rating scale from completely 
unimportant to extremely important.  
Results indicated that identity is a protected value and when triggered in threatening 
medical scenarios, people were not willing to trade the integrity of their gender identity for a less 
risky alternative, even when the option to preserve identity carried a higher risk of death.  Both 
participant gender and the gender of the protagonist in the hypothetical medical dilemmas 
predicted choices across the decision problems.  More specifically, when the participant’s gender 
identity matched the gender identity of the protagonist in the medical scenario (e.g., a female-
identified respondent making a choice about which breast cancer treatment to pick for the female 
in the medical dilemma), participants chose the identity-preserving option more than respondents 
whose gender identities were not matched to the protagonist (e.g., male or transgender men’s 
responses to the breast cancer dilemma).  
Thus, the current findings demonstrate that identity is a protected value in decision 
making in medical contexts, even when the identity preserving context involves greater risk than 
an alternative choice.  These data also provide an empirical test of standard dual process against 
fuzzy-trace theory mental representations in decision making that involves a trade off.  
 
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
 
 Seth Pardo was born in Miami Beach, FL.  He received his B.A. with distinction in 
Psychology and a Certificate in Human Development from Duke University in 2003.  Following 
graduation, Seth obtained a two-year academic appointment as an Associate in Psychiatry at 
Harvard Medical School and was the Research Coordinator for the Bipolar Disorder Research 
Program under the supervision of Dr. S. Nassir Ghaemi at the Cambridge Health Alliance.  
In 2008, Seth received his M.A. in Developmental Psychology from Cornell University, 
where he is also recognized as a Knight Scholar for Writing in the Disciplines and as a Graduate 
Student Affiliate to both the Institute of Social Sciences and the Cornell Population Program.  
While at Cornell, Seth served his fellow graduates as a Departmental Representative to the 
Graduate and Professional Student Assembly and as Graduate Student Chair to the University 
Assembly.  He currently holds professional leadership positions as a Trainee Representative to 
the Society for Medical Decision Making Education Committee, a Member of the Research and 
Data Analysis Advisory Group for the California State-wide LGBTQ Mental Health Disparities 
Project, and the Laboratory Coordinator for the Laboratory for Rational Decision Making under 
the direct mentorship of Dr. Valerie Reyna. 
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my Papa Shike. 
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
“Every Warrior of the Light has felt afraid of going into battle. Every Warrior of 
the Light has, at some time in the past, lied or betrayed someone. Every Warrior of the 
Light has trodden a path that was not his. Every Warrior of the Light has, at least once, 
believed he was not a Warrior of the Light. Every Warrior of the Light has failed in his 
spiritual duties. Every Warrior of the Light has said ‘yes’ when he wanted to say ‘no.’ 
Every Warrior of the Light has hurt someone he loved. That is why he is a Warrior of the 
Light, because he has been through all this and yet has never lost hope of being better 
than he is.” 
- Paulo Coelho, from Warrior of the Light 
Writing a dissertation is a lot like being the Warrior of the Light. The entire 
process is a microlife where one births ideas, runs experiments to test the ideas, receives 
guidance on how to make these ideas better, and experiences failure with some (ok many) 
of those ideas.  But, in the end, as is for the Warrior of the Light, after going through all 
that it takes to finish a dissertation, one can stand tall knowing that he or she has been 
through it all and yet never lost hope of being better than he or she once was.   
As in life, a dissertation is never accomplished alone. I owe a great deal of thanks 
and gratitude to my dissertation committee chair, Dr. Valerie Reyna, and to my 
committee members Dr. Ritch Savin-Williams and Dr. Qi Wang.  Combined, your 
guidance, confidence, critical feedback, and intellectual support are second to none.  
Thank you for helping me keep perspective throughout this process. This dissertation is 
far improved from where it began in large part due to your comments and suggestions. I 
thank each of you deeply. 
 vi 
To my family and friends, I have said it before, and I’ll say it several times more, 
you are my rock and with every phone call I am home.  Thank you for your endless love 
and support. Your steadfastness despite my being thousands of miles from home is an 
inspiration, and is the perfect antidote when the going gets really, really tough.  It is easy 
to get wrapped up in the Ivory Tower of academia, but you all provide a solid foundation 
upon which I build my own intellectual tower.   
To my new group of friends out west, THANK YOU for reminding me how 
important it is to nurture my heart and soul. Your kindness, your love, and your bountiful 
confidence in me continuously recharged my batteries to keep on keepin’ on when I was 
ready to plotz! In particular, among you, I wish to extend a very special “thank you” to 
Akhila E. A. Kolesar.  In the words of Anais Nin, “And then the day came when the risk 
to remain tight in the bud was more painful than the risk to blossom.” Thank you, with 
love. 
~ 
This research was made possible in part by Summer Research Fellowships 
provided by the College of Human Ecology and Dr. Valerie Reyna, and a Spring 2011 
Research Assistantship provided by Dr. Valerie Reyna. 
 
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION  1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 2 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 27 
METHOD 33 
Participants 33  
Measures  34 
Procedures 39 
RESULTS 40 
DISCUSSION 73 
REFERENCES 94 
APPENDIX A 104 
APPENDIX B 106 
TABLES 110 
FIGURES 130 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Main effect of problem gender orientation from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 
2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) 
repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
Figure 2. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by standard dual process condition from a 
2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual 
process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
Figure 3. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by problem gender orientation from a 2(problem 
gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process 
condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
Figure 4. Interaction effect of problem gender orientation by participant gender by standard dual 
process condition from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 
2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure 
ANOVA on identity preserving choice  
Figure 5. Interaction effect of roblem gender orientation by participant gender by standard dual 
process magnitude from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 
2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure 
ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
Figure 6. Main effect of problem gender orientation from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 
2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) 
repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
 ix 
Figure 7. Main effect of problem gender orientation from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 
2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure 
ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
Figure 8. Interaction effect of problem gender orientation by participant gender from a 2(problem 
gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) 
repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
Figure 9. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by participant gender from a 2(problem gender 
orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) 
repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
Figure 10. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by gist prime from a 2(problem gender 
orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) 
repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
Figure 11. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by identity prime from a 2(problem gender 
orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) 
repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
Figure 12. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by problem gender orientation by participant 
gender from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 
2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
Figure 13. Main effect of problem gender orientation from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 
2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure 
ANOVA on signed confidence 
 x 
Figure 14. Main effect of problem natal sex from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem 
natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on 
signed confidence 
Figure 15. Interaction effect of problem gender orientation by participant gender from a 
2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) 
x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
Figure 16. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by participant gender from a 2(problem gender 
orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) 
repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
Figure 17. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by gist prime from a 2(problem gender 
orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) 
repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
Figure 18. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by problem gender orientation by participant 
gender from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 
2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
 
 xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Sample demographics 
Table 2. A 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard 
dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving 
choice  
Table 3. A 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard 
dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
Table 4. A 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex orientation) x 2(gist prime) x 
2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice  
Table 5. A 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex orientation) x 2(gist prime) x 
2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measures ANOVA on signed confidence  
Table 6. A 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex orientation) x 3(gender) x 
3(randomization) repeated measures ANOVA on identity preserving choice  
Table 7. Means by gender group and decision problem for each value rating 
Table 8. A 4(decision problem) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure 
ANOVA on value rating 
Table 9. Correlations table of value ratings and choice across the four decision problems 
 
 
1 
 INTRODUCTION 
Most theories of risky decision making emphasize the trade-off between degrees of risk 
and amounts of reward (Reyna & Farley, 2006).   In particular, dual-process approaches suggest 
that decision makers can operate in multiple modes—analytical and intuitive—that result in 
differing choices (Fujita & Han, 2009; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; 
Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007; Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008).   However, there 
are gaps in the extant literature regarding how identity influences decision making, in particular, 
whether people are willing to trade off who they are in order to reduce or avoid serious risks. 
I first define protected (sacred) values.  Second, I review the literature on the role of 
identity in decision making and discuss how protected values as a special class of values predict 
noncompensatory decision making, that is, how testing identity as a protected value should tell 
us more about decision making in circumstances that objectively involve a trade-off.  Third, I 
review two dual process models (fuzzy-trace theory and standard dual process theory), and 
discuss the predictive implications of each model in decision making scenarios that are relevant 
to the present study, in particular how gist processing (a construct from fuzzy-trace theory) 
enhances the identity-protecting effect.   Fourth, I review the literature on the relationship 
between risk perception and medical decision making, and highlight the circumstances in which 
identity serves as a primary consideration for certain kinds of medical decisions that involve a 
trade off.  
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 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Sacred (protected) values 
Sacred values are personal values that are protected from trade-offs with other values 
(Baron & Ritov, 2009) or social norms (Tetlock, 2003).  For example, imagine the following 
question:  How many species of fish are you willing to destroy in order to save 20 species of fish 
that would go extinct if nothing were done?  Baron and Ritov (2009) demonstrated that people 
with protected values against the destruction of species reported a lower maximum number of 
species that they were willing to destroy.  In some cases, a protected value against killing fish 
species may be absolute in principle.  That is, participants with an absolute value against species 
destruction (such as amongst extreme biological conservationists) report a firm unwillingness to 
destroy any number of species even if it were to save some fish.  
According to the sacred value protection model (SVPM), an individual struggles 
to preserve and protect both the private self and the public identity from any action which 
is considered immoral (either by the individual himself or by society at large).   In other 
words, when sacred values are tested or compromised, research suggests that individuals 
experience an aversive arousal state, or what Tetlock (2003) referred to as a “moral 
outrage” that creates cognitive, affective and behavioral reactions.  
The current study is a test of the sacred value protection model, and represents an 
empirical test of whether gender identity has sacred value properties for the individual.  
In the present study, individuals with different gender identities (man, woman, or 
transgender) will be presented with different medical dilemmas where the choices pit a 
gender-identity preserving option that is paired with a high risk consequence against a 
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 gender identity threatening option that is paired with a lower risk consequence.  For 
example, 
Imagine that at your most recent doctor’s appointment you were found to have 
stage I node-negative breast cancer.   This means that cancer has formed in the 
breast but it has not yet spread.   There are two contemporary treatment options 
for treatment of this disease (breast conserving surgery or total mastectomy).   If 
you choose mastectomy, the cancer and the breasts will all be surgically removed, 
and there is very little risk (4%) of cancer recurrence.   If you choose breast 
conserving surgery, only the cancerous tumor will be removed using a small 
incision to preserve the natural breast, but there is a two to three times greater risk 
(8-14%) of cancer recurrence.    
In this scenario, the participant is faced with a decision between the breast-conserving 
surgery and the total mastectomy.  The mastectomy is identity threatening (for many women) 
because it requires surgical removal of the breasts.  However, in this example, a mastectomy 
carries half the risk for cancer recurrence than breast conserving surgery.  In contrast, breast 
conserving surgery preserves a woman’s gender identity because it preserves the natural breast.  
However this option carries twice as much recurrence risk (Veronesi, Cascinelli, Mariani, Greco, 
Saccozzi, Luini, et al, 2002).   Thus, the implied trade-off is to either maintain identity integrity 
(by selecting the breast conserving option) and incur a higher cancer recurrence risk, or to trade-
off identity integrity (to give up her breasts via mastectomy) for a lower objective cancer risk. 
Expected utility theory states that decision makers choose between risky or uncertain 
prospects by comparing their expected utility values, (i.e., the weighted sums obtained by the 
magnitude of outcomes multiplied by their respective probabilities). For example, am I willing to 
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 play a chance game if I have a 50% chance of winning $200? The expected utility of this game 
is .50 x $200 or $100. Thus, by definition, expected utility is both multiplicative and scope 
sensitive. To keep a constant expected value, there is an inverse relationship between probability 
and the magnitude of the payoff; in other words, if my odds of winning decrease to 10%, the 
magnitude of the payoff must increase to $1000 to maintain an equal expected value of $100. 
Greater risk requires greater reward to make it worth the gamble.  
Bartels and Medin (2007) among others (e.g., Ritov & Baron, 1999) note that individuals 
are typically quantity sensitive, but that one displays quantity insensitivity (noncompensatory 
decision patterns) when presented with alternatives that involve  a protected value.  Thus, this 
study tests whether participants will display noncompensatory decision making in order to 
protect gender identity even when the alternative choice presents a great threat of risk, including 
a small chance of death. 
Imagine the following sacred value dilemma (from Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2001).  The participant is asked to imagine the following dilemma: “A 
runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course.   
The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of 
tracks where it will kill one person instead of five” (Greene, et al., 2001).  
One explanation of this forced-choice dilemma suggests that people should be more 
willing to hit the switch than not because saving five is more than saving one.   Indeed, Reyna 
and Casillas (2009) argued that verbatim (precise, quantitative) mental representations support 
making numerical comparisons (one vs. five).  Thus, in this scenario, people were more willing 
to hit the switch in order to save five people at the expense of one.  Put slightly differently, 
participants were willing to let the trolley kill one person rather than five. 
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 In an alternative problem, the participant is told that “a trolley threatens to kill five 
people, and you are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in 
between the oncoming trolley and the five people.   In this scenario, the only way to save the five 
people is to push this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below.   He will die if you do this, 
but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others.”   The specifics of this choice is 
between the deaths of one person versus five people (same as in the trolley car problem above), 
but the gist here is a choice between “I kill one person” versus “the trolley kills five people” 
(Reyna & Casillas, 2009). Thus, the participant must decide if he/she is willing to actively push 
one stranger to his death to save the five people from the oncoming trolley.    
As explained in Reyna and Casillas (2009), two decision dilemmas may produce 
contradictory outcomes if a sacred value (e.g. “thou shalt not kill”) is activated in one version of 
a decision dilemma i.e., (Am I willing to kill one person, else a trolley will kill five people?) and 
a utilitarian approach is activated in a different version of the same dilemma (i.e., If I have a 
choice between a trolley killing one person or five people, it is more rational to save more 
people).    
Returning to our cancer dilemma above, then, the bottom line of the decision regarding 
identity is whether to give up, or not, a part of one’s self or who one is to reduce risk.  Recall that 
in either scenario, there is at least some chance of cancer recurrence, but the dilemma is whether 
to keep or to lose the breast for a chance at a better recurrence outcome.  Research suggests that 
for some women, the breast is a key component of her gender identity as a woman (Britton, 
Britton, & Gronwaldt, 2006; Foster, Slade, & Wilson, 1996).  Thus, if individuals protect gender 
identity as they would any other protected value, then the same decision dilemma should produce 
contradictory outcomes across differently gendered persons. 
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  In a scenario currently relevant to health care, individuals experiencing gender 
dysphoria (i.e., persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of inappropriateness in the 
gender role of that sex; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) sometimes feel torn about 
whether to medically transition to live socially in the gender with which one identifies.  There 
are great medical risks involved including those associated with general surgery (e.g., blood loss, 
surgical site infection, anesthesia-related death) as well as social risks including social rejection 
(Cohen-Kettenis & Gooren, 1999), relationship breakups, and in some instances the loss of 
certain civil rights such as the right to legal marriage or child custody rights (Currah, Juang, & 
Minter, 2006).   
In one recent survey of 170, mostly White adults (mean age 29, range 18-56 years) that 
asked whether a medical transition was necessary to feel like one was living authentically, nearly 
100% of female-to-male transsexuals reported “yes,” compared to less than 10% of non-
transsexual natal females who self-identified as gender nonconforming with masculine but not 
cross-gender identifications (Pardo, 2008).  Thus, among female-to-male transsexuals, not to 
pursue the medical transition because of the medical and social risk would mean to trade off a 
great part of authentic living, in other words, who one is.  
Identity defined 
Identity has a complex conceptual history that spans multiple disciplines including 
psychology (Tajfel, 1981), sociology (Burke, 1980), anthropology (Eriksen, 2001), and the 
humanities (Butler, 1990; Feinberg, 1993).  Moreover, due to its diverse history, identity has 
rarely assumed a single consensual definition.  For example, in the late 1800s, the study of the 
self became a formal psychological concern. William James first developed a theory of self-
concept whereby the self was divided into four components: the material, social, and spiritual 
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 selves, and the pure ego (James, 1890).  More recently, self-concept was still viewed as a set of 
internal schemas and goals (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Markus, 1990).  In other words, the focus 
of identity was directed inward, on the individual as separate from society.  
However, over approximately the past 50 years, the structure and content of self-concept 
has shifted outward.  Several of the major theorists who published on the self since James’ early 
work noted that even though each person may be unique and keep a private sense of self, the 
individual must be understood in relation to others; in other words, the self is inherently social 
(Bowlby, 1969; Mead, 1934; Sullivan, 1940).  Consequently, more recent understandings of the 
self involve a sense of embeddedness within a social context (Collins, 2000); that is, a sense of 
inseparability of the self from the social context.  Thus, if the self is inherently social, and if in 
order to study self-concept one must be able to identify and distinguish different social groups as 
unique and separate collections of similar individuals, then an identifier, or an identity, is 
necessary for the purpose of social categorization.  As Frable (1997) explains, identity is the 
individual’s psychological relationship to particular social category systems.  For the purpose of 
this study, it is not the goal to argue one theory of identity is better or more accurate than 
another.  Rather, it is important for the purpose of this study to establish the premise that an 
identity is an organizing construct within which an individual feels a sense of belonging and 
around which the individual bases one’s behavior. 
Tajfel’s (1981) social identity model proposed that the social part of one’s identity 
derives from the groups to which one belongs.  In other words, because people do not exist in 
isolation, and because we are social beings, our identities are shaped by the groups to which we 
develop a sense of belonging. Social identity theory also suggests that once a group of belonging 
is identified and engaged, one acquires both a positive sense of who he/she is, and a clear 
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 understanding of how to act toward others who are within one’s group compared to those who 
are not in the group.  In other words, the sense of who and what we are (our identity) is in part 
constructed based on the meaning that is derived from our chosen social group as well as our 
learned behavioral interactions within that social environment.   
As an example of how the meaning derived from social group membership influences 
individual behavior, consider the social categorization system of gender. Distinct from sex, 
which (as a noun) is most often used to describe one’s demographic categorization as either male 
or female (Deaux, 1993; Ruble, Martin, & Berenbaum, 2007), and is often measured biologically 
via sex chromosomes (Hines, 2004) or physically by genital appearance (Preves, 2000), gender 
is the trait characteristics and behaviors culturally associated with one’s sex (e.g., masculinity, 
femininity, or some androgynous combination thereof; Hines, 2004).  Moreover, as a social 
categorization system, gender carries an expected set of behaviors, attitudes, dress style and 
appearance; and often, what is appropriate gendered behavior and gendered self-concept is 
learned early (Bem, 1989).   
In fact, social learning theory posits that children come to understand sex-typical gender 
roles and behaviors by modeling same-sex persons (often a same-sex parent), and via social 
comparison and reinforcement (Mischel, 1973).  In one behavioral study of children, Slaby and 
Frey (1975) found that children with an advanced understanding of gender spent more time 
observing same-sex models.  Thus, our gendered self-concept, or our gender identity is in part 
constructed based on our early experiences, and the understanding that there is meaning in 
behavior and appearance to signal one’s gender.  People learn early how to behave in 
“appropriate” gendered ways in accordance with one’s natal sex, and interact with others within 
the same gendered group and outside of that gendered group.  
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 The current study is built on several theoretically motivated premises.  First, identity is 
a sense of who we are. Second, identity derives meaning from social group membership. Third, 
gender is a social group to which one may feel a sense of belonging and membership, and thus 
individuals have a gender identity that has meaning. Fourth, identity is associated with behavior. 
Moreover, one of the main goals of this study is to test a theoretically motivated mechanism by 
which gender identity predicts behavior in contexts in which individuals are asked to make 
tradeoffs between preserving gender identity and incurring risk.  
Identity and self-discrepancy 
Higgins (1987) suggested that people make choices to behave in ways that avoid self-
discrepancies; this may be alternatively understood that people behave in ways to preserve the 
status quo of one’s sense of self and to maintain consistency with one’s identity.  In one study 
that tested the relationship between self-discrepancy and negative emotional outcomes, Higgins, 
Klein, and Strauman (1985) found a positive association with self-discrepancy and negative 
emotions such as depression, fear, and threat. More specifically, as the discrepancies increase 
between one’s actual self and one’s idealized self, participants report stronger feelings of 
disappointment, dissatisfaction, inefficacy, and disinterest. Moreover, as the discrepancies 
increase between one’s actual self and what is perceived as what one ought to be (or ought to 
do), participants report stronger feelings of fear and threat.  
Self-discrepancy research has not tested this theory within specific types of identities 
such as gender or race or class, but instead has allowed the participant to generate his/her own 
statements about what he/she considers part of the actual self, the idealized self, and who one 
ought to be without domain restriction.  Higgins and colleagues demonstrated that people’s 
behaviors are, in theory, patterned towards maintaining self-consistency with identity-related 
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 goals. Thus, in extension of the current self-discrepancy literature the current study tests 
people’s intolerance of gender identity discrepancy when forced to choose between a gender 
discrepancy and risk. It is interesting to note that this question has not yet been directly tested in 
the experimental literature.  However, as summarized above, there exists behavioral research that 
provides evidence for how people respond in moral dilemmas.  Thus, given that a protected 
value predicts when a person is unwilling to make a trade-off (Baron & Ritov, 2008; Tetlock, 
2003); given that an individual will act to preserve and protect one’s identity from any action, 
which is considered immoral or at odds with societal norms; and given that as a social 
categorization system, gender carries an expected set of behaviors, attitudes, dress style and 
appearance that is positively and negatively reinforced by social norms, I argue that gender 
identity is a protected value.  The current study will directly test whether gender identity is a 
protected value by asking participants to choose between gender identity preservation and an 
option of lesser risk. 
Identity as a protected (sacred) value 
Imagine that a woman of childbearing age is dying from cancer and the only treatment 
that will save her life requires a total mastectomy (breast removal).  The surgery has both a high 
success rate and a low recurrence rate, but challenges a sacred value of womanhood, the breasts, 
which also serve as a natural bonding tool with her potential future child (Britton, Britton, & 
Gronwaldt, 2006).   In fact, women who intended to breast-feed were more satisfied with their 
body shape and reported higher levels of maternal-fetal attachment (Foster, Slade, & Wilson, 
1996).   From a utilitarian standpoint, this decision seems like an obvious choice: it is better to 
have the surgery.   However, is she willing to live as an “incomplete woman?” 
11 
 As reviewed above, researchers have applied dual-process approaches to explain 
variations in moral reasoning, although the standard dual-process accounts differ from fuzzy-
trace theory (Green et al, 2001; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Reyna & Casillas, 2009).  Given the 
work of Higgins and colleagues (Higgins, Klein, and Strauman, 1985), which demonstrates that 
people feel negative emotions including some degree of self-threat as self-discrepancy increases, 
this suggests that people will choose to behave in ways that minimize self-threat.  However, it 
remains an empirical question whether people are willing to incur any degree of risk in order to 
minimize self-threat.  
Dual process models, memory, and decision making 
As described above, identity is, in part, constructed based on the meaning that is derived 
from the social context.  However, the literature remains unclear whether identity alone will 
predict decision making or whether people will weigh risks and benefits for a given behavior.  
Fuzzy-trace theory is a dual-process model of memory and reasoning that provides a framework 
for understanding how people extract meaning from everyday experiences, including how 
meaning depends on the self (Reyna, & Adam, 2003).    
According to fuzzy-trace theory, thinking is anchored at one extreme by qualitative 
thinking that is based on simple meaning-based (gist-based) representations and values such as 
“avoid risk,” and at the other extreme by precise surface form (verbatim) representations that 
support trading off precise risks and benefits (Reyna, 2004; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995).   For 
example, a gist or qualitative memory representation of information presented may be retrieved 
as “more than” or “increasing” (Reyna & Brainerd, 1994, p.  261).  In contrast, verbatim or 
quantitative memory representations of information presented pertain to the surface form of the 
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 stimuli (e.g., the exact wording of a message that a woman’s lifetime risk of invasive breast 
cancer is 13%).    
Tests of fuzzy-trace theory demonstrate that people generally rely more on gist 
information rather than verbatim information to make decisions (Reyna, Lloyd, & Brainerd, 
2003).  Age effects have also been observed. Although traditional theories of cognitive 
development predict that children progress from implicit, emotional thinking to explicit, 
analytical reasoning, research informed by fuzzy-trace theory shows the opposite pattern; 
children and adolescents are less likely to use gist (intuitive) representations for decision-making 
than are adults (Reyna & Adam, 2003; Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Reyna et al., 2003). For example, in 
one developmental study, Reyna and Ellis (1994) presented modified framing problems to 
N=111 children of varying ages (28 preschoolers, 40 second graders, and 43 fifth graders).  
Children were given two blocks (one gain block and one loss block) of nine problems each.   
In a traditional framing problem, the preamble asks the respondent to “Imagine that the 
United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 
people.  Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume that the 
exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows:”  In the gain 
frame, an example sure choice alternative is “If program A is adopted, 200 people will be 
saved.” The corresponding gamble option would be “If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 
probability that 600 people will be saved and a 2/3 probability that no one will be saved.”  In the 
loss frame, an example of a gamble choices alternative is “If program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 
probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.” 
Adults’ choices shift from the sure thing for gains to the gamble for losses, despite the 
equivalence of the options in the two frames.   
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 Reyna and Ellis (1994) adapted framing problems for use with children and young 
adolescents.  For developmental appropriateness, Reyna and Ellis (1994) presented the children 
with transparent bags of prizes so the children could see their possible winnings. Children were 
shown their sure choice winnings on the table before them, and placed the gamble winnings 
opposite a table barrier. The authors varied the levels of cumulative risk in the gamble between  
!, 2/3, and " chance to win nothing (in the gain frame) or to lose something (in the loss frame). 
Children were told that at the end of the game they would win a real prize based on their choices 
in the game – which they did receive. 
Results demonstrated developmental differences in processing quantitative dimensions 
such as risk evaluations in decision making.  Preschoolers did not show standard framing effects; 
that is, their choices were the same across gain (28% sure choices) and loss conditions (26% sure 
choices).  Second graders showed a mixed response pattern whereby at lower levels of risk the 
choice patterns looked like the preschoolers, but at the highest risk levels, second graders showed 
reverse framing patterns (preferring the sure thing in the loss frame and the gamble in the gain 
frame).  Finally, fifth graders were the youngest group to show standard framing choice patterns, 
but only for problems with low stakes, and they showed reverse framing for large stakes.  
Overall, risk taking declined from childhood to adolescence because processing became more 
gist-based (i.e., based less and less on processing exact risks and rewards). 
In sum, the results from this study contradict what traditional theories of cognitive 
development would predict.  They also contradict traditional economic models.  According to 
traditional economic models (e.g., expected utility theory), the frame of the problem is irrelevant. 
Prospect theory predicts gain-loss differences, but does not predict changes with development or 
with mental representations.  However, as predicted by fuzzy-trace theory, with age, there is an 
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 increase in framing biases,  whereby the youngest age group (e.g., preschoolers in Reyna & 
Ellis, 1994) showed no difference in choices across frames, and the oldest age group (e.g., fifth 
graders in Reyna & Ellis, 1994) showed similar choice patterns as adults (for low stakes).  
Similar developmental differences in processing are observed between experts and novices 
(Lloyd & Reyna, 2001; Reyna, 2008; Reyna & Adam, 2003). 
These and other results indicate that analytical processing may result in greater risk 
taking (Mills, Reyna, & Estrada, 2008). Indeed, more recent research (see Reyna, 2008) shows 
that differences in decision making occur because adults simplify information as much as 
possible in order both to understand risk and to make decisions based on the balanced risks and 
benefits.  Tests of fuzzy-trace theory have confirmed that when people are cued to rely more on 
gist representations they display more risk avoidance for unhealthy choices (Mills et al., 2008).    
Thus, in this view, it makes sense that risk perception for surgery would depend on a person’s 
identity. 
Fuzzy-trace theory, memory, and retrieval 
Previous research demonstrates that information recollection is affected by how 
information is stored and retrieved (Brainerd, Wright, & Reyna, 2002).  For example, in line with 
fuzzy-trace theory, Reyna and Kiernan (1994) demonstrated that test probes differ in how they 
cue gist and verbatim memory traces: while one cognitive operation may facilitate retrieval of 
verbatim traces of individual verbal targets which results in recall of stored surface information, 
another operation retrieves gist memories of previously presented content and processes them 
constructively (relying on the bottom-line meaning of the semantic content) to reconstruct 
targets.  Research by Brainerd and colleagues (2002) demonstrated that how information was 
presented to an individual had an effect on the respondent’s direct access to and retrieval of the 
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 stored information.  In other words, the manipulation of the surface form of the presented items 
directed information retrieval toward the targets (rather than toward relations among targets).  
In one study theoretically motivated by fuzzy-trace theory, information recall was tested 
as a function of information processing by using an atypical font manipulation (Brainerd et al., 
2002).  The atypical visual study task (e.g., presenting an unusual font type) was designed to 
interfere with direct cognitive access to the stored information by disrupting participants’ normal 
encoding of the surface forms of familiar words (e.g., iron, copper, steel, gold).  In other words, 
the atypical fonts interfered with participants’ ordinary methods of encoding.  Thus, a surface 
“distracter” task should disrupt verbatim encoding and when cued for recall, the participant 
would rely more on gist processing. 
Each of these kinds of representations is associated with different cognitive processes.   
This study tests two cognitive processes, analytical and intuitive, against each other in tasks that 
involve decision-making.   Fuzzy-trace theory provides evidence that gist-based processing is 
generally protective against risk (Mills et al., 2008).   However, there are situations when gist-
based, categorical thinking would be expected to promote risk taking, such as when medical 
decisions involve tradeoffs between identity and risk.   For example, a woman with stage I breast 
cancer may have a choice between a lumpectomy (breast conserving surgery) versus 
mastectomy.    Although five-year survival outcomes for either procedure are about equal (when 
breast conserving surgery is paired with adjuvant chemotherapy), evaluation of the quantitative 
risks for each procedure suggests that, overall, breast-conserving surgery is more objectively 
risky than mastectomy because the risk of cancer recurrence is 8-14% versus approximately 4%, 
respectively (National Cancer Institute, 2009; Veronesi, Cascinelli, Mariani, Greco, Saccozzi, 
Luini, Aguilar, & Marubini, 2002).    However, the qualitative risk of mastectomy is a deep-
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 seated feeling of loss because of the feeling that one’s womanhood is assaulted or mutilated 
following removal of the breast (Wilmoth, 2001).   
 Thus, based on the assumptions of fuzzy-trace theory, respondents who are induced to 
use verbatim or analytical processing should pick the decision option with lower quantitative risk 
(mastectomy), and respondents that are induced to use gist or intuitive processing cues should 
pick the decision option that is more in line with the bottom line meaning of his/her individual 
values (pick lumpectomy if the participant is a woman so as to avoid losing one’s breasts).    In 
other words, respondents primed to use gist processes will base their decisions on intuition or gut 
reactions and emotions in response to the dilemma, and not on quantitative risk evaluations. 
Affect versus cognition: Standard dual process theory 
The second dual process theory I plan to test in this research study is the dual process 
valuation model (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004).   It has been shown that valuation-by-calculation 
and valuation-by-feeling are two processes by which people assess the value of a target.   Hsee 
and Rottenstreich (2004) demonstrated that when participants are primed to think quantitatively, 
changes in magnitude (scope) have an approximately linear relationship with participant’s 
reported value of the target.   In contrast, when participants are primed to valuation-by-feeling, 
they are sensitive to the presence or absence of a stimulus; in other words, value is moderated 
categorically (e.g., 0 and 1), and is insensitive to variations in magnitude.  
For example, in a recent study, participants were primed to one of the two valuation 
conditions (calculation or feeling) and then were asked, “How much would you be willing to pay 
for the bundle of Madonna CDs” (p. 24)? The scope of the bundle was either five or 10 CDs 
(presented in a between-participants design).   Participants primed to valuation-by-calculation 
were scope-sensitive; that is, they were willing to pay more on average for more CDs, whereas 
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 participants primed to valuation-by-feeling demonstrated no difference in amount they were 
willing to pay for 10 CDs versus five.  
 Building on Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) dual process valuation model (DPVM), for 
this study, DPVM would predict that participants primed to valuation-by-calculation would be 
more scope-sensitive to the survival estimates in the decision problems, and thus, should choose 
the option that offers higher objective survival (i.e., lower objective risk).   However, 
participants primed to valuation-by-feeling should be scope-insensitive and should choose the 
option that best fits their feelings about the decision.   For example, when primed to valuation-
by-feeling, participants (especially men) deciding between hormone therapy and prostatectomy 
(for prostate cancer treatment) should choose prostatectomy because despite the high risk 
involved with surgery (e.g., high rates of year-long incontinence; complications from anesthesia) 
the hormone-therapy-induced gynecomastia (male breast development) is a threat to manhood 
and should result in more aversive feelings toward hormone therapy.    
Risk perception and medical decision making 
Every surgery involves some degree of risk.   The most recent report of national health 
statistics demonstrated that over 46 million inpatient surgical procedures are documented 
annually (DeFrances, Lucas, Buie, & Golosinskiy, 2006).   Of these procedures, over 200,000 
are breast cancer diagnoses in women, and an additional 200,000 are prostate cancer diagnoses in 
men.  Medical decisions that involve some degree of risk are quite prevalent.  Moreover, people 
do not always have a clear understanding of risks, such as the risks of cancer, risk of contracting 
sexually transmitted infections, or condom effectiveness in reducing rates of infections (Peters, 
McCaul, Stefanek, & Nelson, 2006; Reyna & Adam, 2003).   Also, people do not always have a 
clear understanding of the likelihood of various outcomes of medical screening tests and 
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 treatments (Peters, et al., 2006; Reyna, Lloyd, & Whalen, 2001; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & 
Dieckmann, 2009).   For example, with genetic testing, people tend to overestimate their risk of 
cancer and underestimate the risks associated with genetic testing itself, such as the stigma 
associated with testing positive for a cancer susceptibility gene (Reyna, et al., 2001).   In extreme 
cases, exaggerated risk judgments may lead to anxiety that decreases self-reported quality of life 
and may contribute to an increase in self-protective behaviors or unnecessary (and aggressive) 
medical treatments (e.g., prophylactic mastectomy in the absence of a family history or genetic 
vulnerability to breast cancer) (Erblich, Bovbjerg, & Valdimarsdottir, 2000). 
Patients often confront the decision whether to have surgery by weighing the risks against 
the probabilistic benefits (Lloyd, Hayes, Bell, & Naylor, 2001; Reyna & Hamilton, 2001).   
Indeed, most interventions that are designed to improve higher order reasoning skills assume the 
computer metaphor of mind and accordingly emphasize precise, quantitative thinking and 
reasoning (Reyna & Brainerd, 1994).   However, recent research suggests that people are likely 
to remember the imprecise gist representations of information they have stored, such as recalling 
“high risk of dying of heart attack” to make medical decisions rather than the verbatim diagnosis 
of “20% probability of acute cardiac ischemia” (Lloyd & Reyna, 2001; Reyna & Brainerd, 1994; 
Reyna, Lloyd, & Brainerd, 2003).   In other words, people simplify information as much as 
possible in order both to understand risk and to make decisions based on the balanced risks and 
benefits.   For example, Lloyd and colleagues (2001) surveyed patients who were undergoing a 
medical intervention for blocked arteries (carotid endarterectomy, CEA) to prevent a stroke, but 
which carried a smaller risk for inducing a stroke.   In this study, patients were faced with a real 
risk dilemma whereby they had to consent to a somewhat risky procedure in order to avoid the 
risk of a more life-threatening event that had not yet occurred.   
19 
 Specifically, 73 patients who were on the waiting list for surgery were surveyed after 
seeing their vascular surgeon in order to determine their understanding of the risks of stroke as a 
result of surgery and their risks if they had decided not to go ahead with the operation.   After 
participants were briefed on the procedure and given information regarding their real risk 
estimates, participants were surveyed for their recall.   Results demonstrated that patients’ recall 
of the verbatim risk information was very poor, and only one patient could recall all of the risks 
that he had been told.   However, although patients’ stroke risk estimates were variable (range 
22–100%, mean 57%, actual risk 22% for not having the procedure) and inaccurate (range 0–
65%, mean 10%, actual risk quoted 2%), most patients understood the order of risks (the gist of 
which option had the most risk).   Thus, data suggest that real patients used fuzzy-processing 
(gist representations) of the available information for risk perceptions of surgery (Reyna, 2008; 
Reyna & Adam, 2003; Reyna & Hamilton, 2001).    
Mental representations alone, whether gist or verbatim, do not determine choice 
outcomes.  Applications of fuzzy-trace theory suggest that after information is presented, people 
also retrieve their past experiences, values, principles, and knowledge and apply them to the 
representation before making a decision (Reyna, 2008).  For example, the woman who thinks 
that her 22.2% lifetime breast cancer risk is high because it is higher than average, has retrieved 
knowledge about what is the “average risk.”  Second, if this woman thinks her risk is high 
because her sister and her mother also had breast cancer, she has retrieved information about her 
past experiences and may decide to pursue aggressive treatment because she has retrieved the 
value “better to avoid risk.”  Third, if this woman has retrieved a personal value about her breasts 
being a fundamental part of her identity as woman, despite the knowledge that she has higher 
than average risk, she may prioritize keeping her breasts over the higher than average chance of a 
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 cancer diagnosis.  In this third scenario where the woman has retrieved the value “better to 
keep my breasts while I can,” she demonstrates how one can have competing values and 
prioritized values stored in long-term memory.   
Fuzzy-trace theory suggests that because these competing, hierarchical values can be 
differentially cued, it is possible for an individual to make different decisions even when 
presented with the same scenario.  For instance, Reyna and Adam (2003) argued that when 
prostate cancer patients generated a gist of “chemotherapy is poison ” and then retrieved the 
value “poison is bad,” patients were motivated to seek alternatives to chemotherapy; but when 
prostate cancer patients generated a gist of surgery as a way to “remove something bad” from the 
body, more patients choose surgery (e.g., prostatectomy) over a non-surgical alternative (Reyna, 
2008), even when the long term treatment outcome probabilities are equal.   
This study directly tests whether cuing different protected values (such as “save the self” 
or “avoid risk”) results in differential decisions across the same decision problems. If fuzzy-trace 
theory is correct, then to cue different values should produce different decisions across the same 
problems.  For example, when presented with a prostate cancer medical dilemma about whether 
to choose a surgical option to remove the prostate and the associated cancer (i.e., prostatectomy) 
or to have a hormone therapy alternative, the participant must weigh the general risks associated 
with the surgical option, or the body image risks associated with hormone therapy (e.g., male 
breast development, erectile dysfunction).  If the participant is male, then he may be cued to 
retrieve identity-based values (e.g., avoid breast development), and choose prostatectomy over 
hormone therapy.  However, if the male is not cued to retrieve identity-based values, he may 
select hormone therapy over surgery to avoid invasive medical procedures.  
Medical decision making in transgender populations 
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  The decision to pursue gender reassignment through surgery is life-altering and for the 
most part, permanent.  As with any surgical procedure, gender reassignment surgery (GRS) 
involves great risk and uncertainty.  However, some surgeries involve more risk and uncertainty 
than others.  Vaginoplasty, for example, is a procedure whereby the male-to-female (MTF) 
transsexual patient’s original phallus is inverted and reconstructed as a neo-vagina.  One 
prospective follow-up study of n=66 male-to-female transsexuals undergoing vaginoplasty 
reported a range of complications (14% major; 36% minor), but the vast majority were overall 
satisfied with appearance (94%) and function to orgasm (87%), and none expressed regret 
(Krege, Lummen, & Rubben, 2001).   
Phalloplasty, in contrast, is a procedure for female-to-male (FTM) transsexuals that uses 
skin grafts from the forearm, leg, or abdominal areas to create a non-erectile, non-sensate 
phallus.  This procedure involves a greater complication risk and has reportedly dissatisfactory 
sexual function and appearance according to the physicians who conduct the procedures 
(Bettocchi, Ralph, & Pryor, 2005).  For example, nearly three-quarters of the sample experienced 
complications, many of whom experienced multiple major complications that required follow-up 
surgeries and, at the conclusion of the study, nearly one third reported ongoing medical 
problems.  Some patients reported good sexual function (21%) without a prosthesis, but an equal 
proportion required prosthesis for penetrative sex.   
In sum, research regarding GRS has been primarily focused on physical outcome (i.e. 
function and appearance), psychosocial adjustment (e.g., minimizing body dysphoria and gender 
dissonance related depression), and personal satisfaction with the surgical results (Mate-Kole, 
Freschi, & Robin, 1990).  Moreover, the primary aim for GRS outcome research has been to 
identify sources of post-surgical regrets to better finely tune the criteria for surgical approval 
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 (Kuiper & Cohen-kettenis, 1998).  It is remarkable that despite great surgical risk, high 
complication rates, and the degree of functional uncertainty for several gender transition 
procedures, as among those mentioned here, transgender individuals continue to seek these risky 
procedures.  
In a systematic review of various gender reassignment surgeries, Sutcliffe and colleagues 
(2009) found that a limited number of studies reported whether their samples met the current 
recommended standards of care (Meyer, Bockting, Cohen-Kettenis, Coleman, DiCeglie, Devor, 
et al., 2001) for surgical approval.  The reported research limitations also included a dearth of 
prospective follow up, limited controls for direction outcome comparison, using non-
standardized and non-validated outcome measures, and high attrition rates.  Moreover, with one 
exception (Rachlin, 1999), research has paid little attention to the factors that influence surgical 
decision making in trans populations; and, as of this review, no peer-reviewed, published study 
has explored how trans people cognitively process the decision to transition. 
Thus, one of the overarching goals of my empirical program of research is to provide 
greater predictive insight for clinicians working with transgender clients who are contemplating a 
medical transition. An additional goal is to provide more information for clinicians working with 
non-transgender clients who currently struggle with life course decisions (especially decisions 
involving an important trade-off) that may have a fundamental consequence for the self.   In 
applied settings, my research program also more generally serves to aid individuals who are 
contemplating risky surgical decisions.    
It is important to note that although overall reported regret following gender reassignment 
surgeries is low, few studies document the perceived risks and benefits following informed 
consent procedures in any population.   Of the studies available, evidence suggests that patients 
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 (in general) do not fully understand the quantitative risks involved with surgery, yet are able to 
make an intuitive decision for what just “feels right” (Pardo, 2009).  Thus, further research is 
warranted regarding the mechanisms for how cognitive processes and protected values interact to 
motivate judgments and decision-making, particularly in contexts that involve great health 
implications such as sex reassignment surgeries or cancer surgeries (prophylactic or as post-hoc 
treatment).   Using empirically motivated hypothesis-driven research, my dissertation research 
directly addresses these current gaps in the literature and is readily applicable in clinical contexts  
In light of such limited information, specific questions are addressed in the current study: 
Is identity the motivating factor driving a transgender person’s decision to pursue surgical gender 
reassignment? Are transgender people trading-off lower risk options (e.g., non-surgical 
transition) in order to maintain or obtain identity integrity (e.g., self-actualization in one’s 
identified gender)?  In other words, is one’s gender identity so important (e.g., a core value) that 
people are willing to trade-off lower risk in order to maintain identity integrity? 
The present study 
The purpose of the proposed study is to examine how people process conflicts between 
identity and risk when making medical decisions.   Specifically, I examine how people trade-off 
(or refuse to trade-off) protected values such as gender identity (i.e., an enduring sense of self as 
a man or a woman or some combination thereof) against important risks, such as those 
encountered in identity-relevant surgeries (e.g., sex reassignment surgery, prostatectomy, and 
mastectomy).   
This study is also designed to assess how cognitive processing affects medical decision-
making.   More specifically, this study is designed to evaluate alternative dual process models to 
demonstrate both the appropriateness and the extent to which each model makes accurate 
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 predictions about human behavior in medical decision scenarios that involve a core value 
trade-off. Thus, this study tests a crucial factor to determine which of the models has greater 
predictive validity.  
To conduct these critical tests, participants will be randomized into either one of two dual 
process manipulations (fuzzy-trace theory gist or standard dual process theory’s valuation-by-
calculation vs. valuation-by-feeling) or into a control condition where the participant does not 
receive any cognitive priming.  Also, participants will be randomized to either receive or not to 
receive a gender identity prime.  Participants will answer several additional measures to control 
for potential confounding (e.g., history of mastectomy due to cancer), and then will answer at 
least one surgical decision scenario that pits a higher risk option that preserves identity against a 
lower risk option that threatens identity.   
Some scenarios are used as controls for others.  For example, the gynecomastia problem 
controls for gender identity as a man, whereas the breast cancer problem controls for biological 
sex orientation as female.  Also, because mastectomy is the identity preserving option in the 
man-oriented scenario whereas mastectomy is the identity threat option in the female-oriented 
scenario, the choice options control for respondent bias for or against surgery.  A third decision 
problem, the female-to-male gender transition problem, controls both for gender as a man and 
biological sex as female and for direction of choice and bias for or against surgery.  However, 
the decision options are identical to the gynecomastia scenario.  The prostate cancer problem 
controls for direction of choice; more specifically, rather than seeking an identity-preserving 
option, the prostate cancer problem presents the respondent with two threatening options -- 
prostatectomy, which is a surgical procedure and carries a low chance of death, and hormone 
replacement therapy, which is non-surgical, but carries a greater threat to a man’s identity 
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 because it carries a low risk of erectile dysfunction plus a high risk of male breast 
development.  In the prostate cancer scenario, the test is whether the respondent will avoid the 
option that presents a greater identity threat (hormone replacement therapy) and thus choose 
prostatectomy.   
Studies often assume similarities across the dual process theories, but this study is the 
first to test for differences in the constructs by evaluating alternative dual process models in the 
same study.   For example, some dual-process theories distinguish affect from deliberation as the 
dual modes of decision making.  As discussed in prior research (Rivers, Reyna, & Mills, 2008), 
emotion is a part of affect: while one immediately encodes valence of events, one also organizes 
memory around valence (Eigsti, Zayas, Mischel, Shoda, Ayduk,…Casey, 2006).  As discussed in 
Rivers et al (2008), there are some gists that are not simply good versus bad; in other words, 
affect is one type of gist, but not all gists are affective.  Thus, there exist examples of 
noncompensatory decision making that do not involve affect.   
In order to distinguish the effects of valence or mood, my delay manipulation in the fuzzy 
trace condition (gist) affects memory accessibility but does not manipulate affect.  In other 
words, because the manipulation is a delay, emotion is not manipulated.  Therefore, respondent 
affect should remain constant when making a decision in the immediate test condition (verbatim) 
as in the delay condition (gist).  Delay itself is not a core affect manipulation.  Therefore, affect 
would not explain any results consistent with my predictions for fuzzy-trace theory.  Fuzzy-trace 
theory does not require affect (whereas the valuation dual-process manipulations do).  If you do 
not manipulate affect, then the effects cannot be due to affect.   
In contrast to fuzzy-trace theory, the dual-process valuation model assumes that emotion 
is required to obtain effects of scope neglect (not trading off the amount of risk in order to 
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 preserve the self).  I argue in the present study (and specifically test) that it is not the emotional 
charge that is required to get the scope neglect; it may be the gist itself.   
In sum, despite considerable literature on protected values, risk perceptions, medical 
decision making and dual processes theories, previous studies have not yet tested the mechanistic 
relationships among protected values, dual processes, and surgical decision making in the same 
study.  Therefore, the current study provides four unique contributions to the current literature.  
First, this study is the first to test the central concept that identity is a protected value.  Second, 
this study tests dual process implications for surgical decision-making.  Third, this study tests 
how identity is taken into account in decisions regarding risky surgical procedures, especially 
when there is a trade-off between identity and surgical risk.  Fourth, because studies often 
assume similarities across the dual process theories (Smith & DeCoster, 2000), this study is the 
first to test for differences in the constructs by evaluating alternative dual process models in the 
same study. 
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 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
The overarching goal of this research is to test gender identity as a protected value.  A 
second goal of this research is to test whether dual process models effect noncompensatory 
decision processing in medical dilemmas that involve a trade-off between a more risky gender-
preserving option and a less risky option that threatens gender identity.  Thus, this study 
addresses two primary research questions, which are outlined below.  In some cases, specific 
predictions are presented; however, in other cases where there is little prior research on which to 
base specific predictions, hypotheses are presented based on the most related literature available.  
1. Is identity a protected value? 
Hypothesis 1a.  If identity is a protected value, then I anticipate that the data will reveal a 
main effect of identity prime, whereby the tradeoffs between identity and risk will be less 
likely to occur when gender identity is primed than when it is not primed.  In other 
words, respondents in the identity prime condition will select the identity preserving 
choice options for the protagonist in the medical dilemma, regardless of what their own 
gender identity is.  The identity preserving options are:  
• Mastectomy > Chest Binding in the male Gynecomastia problem. 
• Mastectomy > Chest Binding in the Gender Transition problem in order 
to have a more male appearing chest. 
• Lumpectomy > Mastectomy in the Breast Cancer problem in order to 
preserve the integrity of the breast over losing the breast to a mastectomy. 
Hypothesis 1b.  If identity is a protected value, then respondents in the identity prime 
condition will more often choose the identity preserving option, compared to the identity 
threatening treatment option, regardless of what their own gender identity is. 
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 • Prostatectomy > Hormone Replacement Therapy in the Prostate Cancer 
problem. 
Hypothesis 1c.  If identity, specifically, is a protected value, then I anticipate that the 
results will reveal an interaction effect of problem by participant gender, whereby the 
tradeoffs between gender identity preservation and risk will be less likely to occur and 
respondents will select the identity preserving choice options for the protagonist in the 
medical dilemma more often than the alternative across problems when there is a 
participant–protagonist gender match than when there is a participant-protagonist gender 
mismatch. 
• Respondents who identify as men will choose Mastectomy > Chest 
Binding in the Gynecomastia problem more than respondents who do not 
identify as men. 
• Respondents who identify as transgender will choose Mastectomy > 
Chest Binding in the Gender Transition problem more than respondents 
who do not identify as transgender. 
• Respondents who identify as women will choose Lumpectomy > 
Mastectomy in the Breast Cancer problem more than respondents who do 
not identify as women. 
Hypothesis 1d.  Respondents in the identity prime condition will more often avoid the 
more threatening treatment option than the alternative choice for the protagonist in the 
medical dilemma when there is a gender identity-protagonist gender match than when 
there is a mismatch. 
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 • Respondents who identify as men will choose Prostatectomy > 
Hormone Replacement Therapy in the Prostate Cancer problem more than 
respondents who do not identify as men. 
2. Do dual processes predict noncompensatory decision processing in medical dilemmas 
that involve a trade-off between a risky gender-preserving option and a less risky option 
that threatens gender identity? 
Hypothesis 2a.  Given that standard dual process theory predicts that when using system 
2 (the rational system), individuals would calculate the outcome with the best expected 
value (i.e., utility) , it follows then that respondents in the valuation-by-calculation 
condition (a system 2 correlate) should choose the choice option with less risk that still 
has a reward. 
• Mastectomy < Chest Binding in the Gynecomastia problem because there 
is no surgical risk in chest binding, and the compression will still hide the 
breast. 
• Mastectomy < Chest Binding in the Gender Transition problem because 
there is no surgical risk in chest binding, and the compression will still 
hide the breast. 
• Lumpectomy < Mastectomy in the Breast Cancer problem because there 
is more surgical risk with the mastectomy for a similar recurrence 
outcome. 
• Prostatectomy < Hormone Replacement Therapy in the Prostate Cancer 
problem because there is no surgical risk with hormone replacement 
therapy, and the chance of breast development may be considered low. 
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 Hypothesis 2b.  Given that 1) standard dual process theory predicts that when using system 1 
(the intuitive system), individuals think quickly, automatically, effortlessly, and with 
emotion; 2) when using system 1, people tend to apply the most accessible rules for 
making decisions, and as such, individual decisions are often governed by habit; and 3) 
affect tends to be more accessible, it follows then that if identity is a habit-based, readily 
accessible, and emotionally charged construct, then when primed to evaluate-by-feeling 
(a system 1 correlate), respondents will select the decision option consistent with their 
identities. 
• Mastectomy > Chest Binding in the Gynecomastia problem more if the 
respondent identifies as a man. 
• Mastectomy > Chest Binding in the Gender Transition problem more if 
the respondent identifies as a man or as transgender. 
• Lumpectomy > Mastectomy in the Breast Cancer problem more if the 
respondent identifies as a woman. 
• Prostatectomy > Hormone Replacement Therapy in the Prostate Cancer 
problem more if the respondent identifies as a man. 
Hypothesis 2c.  Given that fuzzy-trace theory predicts that when using gist processing, 
individuals think automatically, effortlessly, based on experience and expertise, and 
consistent with their personal values.  It follows that, if identity is both an experience-
based and value-based construct, then when primed to use gist representations for the 
decision problems, respondents will select the choice consistent with their identities. 
• Mastectomy > Chest Binding in the Gynecomastia problem. 
• Mastectomy > Chest Binding in the Gender Transition problem. 
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 • Lumpectomy > Mastectomy in the Breast Cancer problem. 
Hypothesis 2d.  It also follows that when primed to use gist representations for the 
decision problems, respondents will select the choice that best avoids the greatest threat 
to their identity. 
• Prostatectomy > Hormone Replacement Therapy in the Prostate Cancer 
problem. 
Hypothesis 2e.  Given that fuzzy-trace theory predicts that gist processing is the default 
process and the control condition does not provide respondents with a cognitive 
manipulation, if gist is a default process, then in accordance with Hypothesis 2c above, 
individuals in the control condition will select the choice consistent with their values, 
experiences, and expertise.  In other words, respondents should choose the identity 
preserving choice options more often than the alternative when there is a participant 
gender –protagonist gender match. 
• Respondents who identify as men will choose Mastectomy > Chest 
Binding in the Gynecomastia problem more than respondents who do not 
identify as men. 
• Respondents who identify as transgender will choose Mastectomy > 
Chest Binding in the Gender Transition problem more than respondents 
who do not identify as transgender. 
• Respondents who identify as women will choose Lumpectomy > 
Mastectomy in the Breast Cancer problem more than respondents who do 
not identify as women. 
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 Hypothesis 2f.  Also, if gist is a default process, then in accordance with Hypothesis 2c and 2e 
above, individuals in the control condition will select the choice that is consistent with 
their values, experiences, emotions, and expertise.  In other words, respondents will avoid 
the more threatening treatment option more often than the alternative for the protagonist 
in the medical dilemma when there is a respondent gender - protagonist gender match. 
• Respondents who identify as men will choose Prostatectomy > Hormone 
Replacement Therapy in the Prostate Cancer problem more than 
respondents who do not identify as men. 
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 METHOD 
Participants  
Gender congruent males (N=187), gender congruent females (N=471), and transgender-
spectrum participants (N=229) participated in an online study of how people process conflicts 
between identity and risk.  Qualtrics survey software was used to host the survey and initially 
collect the anonymous data prior to download to a secure Cornell University research server 
maintained by the principal researcher and faculty advisor.  According to Qualtrics, N=935 
people clicked on the survey, of which N=887 provided demographic information, for a response 
rate of 95%.  Participants were randomized into a control condition (N=167), a fuzzy-trace 
theory gist only condition (N=147), an identity prime only condition (N=166), a gist prime plus 
identity prime condition (N=166), or to one of four standard dual process theory conditions (low 
affect, low magnitude N=72; low affect, high magnitude N=72; high affect, low magnitude N = 
71; or high affect, high magnitude N= 73).  Recruitment took place in public places (e.g., campus 
libraries, Ho Plaza) and online via identity-based list serves (e.g., FTM International, APA’s 
Division 44 member list) as well as via online student research venues such as Susan within 
Cornell University’s Psychology Department.   Where applicable, Cornell University students 
received one extra credit point for their participation in this study.  It is important to note that 
given the targeted sampling among transmen and University students, this study has more 
transmen than transwomen and more University-aged respondents than other age groups. These 
demographic biases are discussed further in the discussion of the study’s sample below, and both 
age and education will be controlled for in some analyses. 
Transgender is a broad category typically used to denote any individual whose gender-
related identification or external gender presentation conflicts in some way with his or her birth 
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 sex, and who therefore violates conventional standards of unequivocal "male" or “female” sex-
gender congruent identity and behavior.   For the purpose of this study, transgender-spectrum 
participants included anyone whose gender identity is discordant with one’s birth sex.   To 
determine gender congruent and gender discordant (transgender-spectrum participants), 
participant birth sex and current gender identity were recorded.   The Hoffman Gender Scale 
(Hoffman, 2000) was used to operationalize gender congruent and gender discordant 
respondents. 
Both developmental and social psychological research suggests that identity is a core 
component of an individual’s understanding of him or her self.  Wang (2001), among others 
(Bem, 1982), demonstrated that people cognitively organize their memories in ways that give 
meaning to a “self.”  This study tests the notion that identity is central to everyone.  Moreover, 
by presenting actual decision scenarios, this study is designed for any participant, regardless of 
medical history, current medical condition, or gender identity, in order to maximize external 
validity (i.e., generalizability beyond this research sample).  However, transgender participants 
were necessary to specifically test for behavioral and conceptual differences in identity as a 
protected value in determining the role of identity in medical decision paradigms that involve an 
identity trade-off because, as a population, transgender persons struggle daily with identity 
conflict whereas gender-congruent controls often take their gender identity stability for granted. 
Gender Identity  
The Hoffman Gender Scale consists of two versions a female and a male version, and 
each is composed of 14 items pertaining to gender self-concept and gender self-acceptance.  
Response options are rated on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to 
Strongly Agree (7).  An individual total scale score is calculated by taking the average across the 
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 14 items.  Subscale means may also be calculated.  Higher scores indicate sex-gender 
congruence and lower scores indicate sex-gender discordance.  Previous research validated a 
single factor structure Cronbach’s alpha = .97.  The 14 items are listed in Appendix A for both 
the female and male versions of the scale. 
Dual process manipulations 
Two types of dual process manipulations were used in this study: Fuzzy-trace theory ( 
Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; Reyna, 2004) and standard dual process (SDP; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 
2004).  Each dual-process manipulation was piloted for efficacy.  
Fuzzy-trace theory  
Research suggests that  verbatim representations are accessible immediately after original 
information is presented, but become less accessible over a delay; memory responses shift to gist 
after a delay (Reyna & Kiernan, 1994).  That is, forgetting rates are higher over time for 
verbatim than for gist representations.  Also, verbatim representations of information are 
susceptible to interference from cognitive outputs (Titcomb & Reyna, 1995). 
In the gist condition, participants first read the decision problem, then reviewed the 
choice options.  In order to enhance the bottom line meaning of the information in the decision 
problem and to induce gist processing upon retrieval, participants were asked on the next survey 
page, “For you, what is the gist (i.e., the bottom line meaning) of this choice?  Finally, 
participants were asked to make the best choice from the options provided based on what they 
remembered of the preamble.  Thus, in this gist condition, the delay between reading the decision 
problem and responding to the choice options, interferes with accessing the verbatim details and 
promotes retrieval of the bottom line meaning of the information (i.e., the gist), which is then 
used to make a decision.  If participants encode the surface trace details of the presented 
36 
 information, and those memories are accessible, then participants in the control condition 
should pick the choice option with lower objective risk (e.g., mastectomy has lower cancer 
recurrence rates than lumpectomy.  However, participants in the gist condition are susceptible to 
memory interference due to the delay, and thus, are expected to make a choice based more on 
gist memory representations. 
Standard dual process theory   
Participants randomized to the standard dual process condition were asked to “Imagine 
that a team of Chicago zoology students had discovered a number of pandas in a remote Asian 
region.  The team intended to save these endangered animals and was soliciting donations for the 
rescue effort.”  Respondents were randomly assigned to one of four conditions of a 2 (scope) x 2 
(presentation) between-participants design.  The scope variable concerned the number of pandas.  
Participants were told that a zoology team had found either one or four pandas.  Presentation was 
either affect-poor or affect-rich.  Participants were shown a table indicating the number of 
pandas found.  In the affect-poor conditions, the table depicted each panda by either one or four 
large dots.  In the affect-rich conditions, the table depicted each panda with either one or four 
pictures of the panda.  The donation amounts ranged from $10 to $40 in $10 increments and 
were aligned with the choice options so that $10 lined up with 1 panda and $40 lined up with 4 
pandas to suggest each panda is worth a $10 incremental donation schedule. 
A manipulation check was conducted after data collection was completed, using a new 
group of participants (N=77) who were recruited in a similar place and manner.  Participants in 
the manipulation check were asked, “How much emotion is evoked when you look at the dot(s) 
(picture[s])?” Responses were collected on a 10-point likert scale ranging from 1 (a little) to 10 
(a lot).   Participants were also asked, “How strong of an emotional appeal is the team’s request 
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 for donations?” Responses were collected on a 10-point likert scale ranging from 1 (very weak) 
to 10 (very strong).  The dependent measure was “What is the most you would be willing to 
donate?” and participants circled either $10, $20, $30, $40. 
Identity prime  
 Following the procedures of Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady (1999) and McGlone and 
Aronson (2006), participants in the gender identity prime condition will be asked to indicate their 
sex, gender, and answer six additional questions related to their gender identity at the beginning 
of the questionnaire and before receiving the decision problems.  Participants randomized to the 
no identity prime condition will answer the same questions in the demographic section at the end 
of the questionnaire.  The questionnaires were originally constructed to make salient the identity 
of interest (gender) implicitly so as to avoid priming of any gender-related performance 
stereotypes (Shih et al, 1999).  The questions are as follows: 
1. What is your birthsex? (male, female, intersex)  
2. What is your gender? (Man, Woman, Transgender, Transman/FTM, Transwoman/MTF, 
other _______) 
3. Where do you live? (University on-campus, University off-campus, Non-University 
residential) 
4. Do you have a roommate? (yes, no) 
5. What is your living situation? (coed, single sex) 
6. What is your preferred living situation? (coed, single sex) 
7. Please list three reasons why you would prefer a coed living situation. 
8. Please list three reasons why you would prefer a single-sex living situation. 
Choice 
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 To assess the effects of dual processing and identity on surgical decision making, 
participants will be asked to choose one treatment option in a binary forced-choice format.   
Specifically, participants will be asked, “Assuming that whatever option you choose will be 
provided free of charge, from the above available options, which would you choose (pick as if 
you had to choose one of the above in real life)? One of the choice options preserves an 
important component of one’s gendered identity (e.g., the breast, erectile function, etc), but at a 
higher objective risk, and the other choice option presents a lower objective risk but threatens the 
integrity of the important component of one’s gender identity.   Preference for the identity 
preservation despite the higher objective risk would indicate that gender identity is a protected 
value.  
There are a total of four decision problems, one for each of breast cancer, gynecomastia, 
and female-to-male gender reassignment, and a prostate cancer decision problem (see Appendix 
B for the full preamble descriptions and answer choices).  
Signed Confidence 
Signed confidence was recorded on a zero to 100 probability scale.  Participants were 
asked after each choice, “On a scale from 0 to 100%, how confident are you with your choice?”   
The identity preserving option was coded as +1 times the raw score reported, and the identity 
threatening option was coded as -1 times the raw score reported.  
Values 
 At the conclusion of the survey, participants were again presented with the vignette 
preambles in random order, and after each vignette, participants were asked to “please indicate 
on a 1-10 scale how important the following values are to YOU.” One was rated as “least 
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 important” and 10 was rated as “most important.” The same fourteen values were presented 
after each vignette. Table 7 lists each of the 14 values. 
Procedure 
All participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition using the Qualtrics 
survey block design.  The online survey was organized into three sections.   Section I included 
the dual process manipulation and gender identity prime (if the participant is randomized into the 
identity prime condition).   Section II will included the decision problems.   Section III included 
a series of follow up questions designed to control for potential confounding factors such as 
memory, risk perception, and basic demographic information.   
After answering each decision problem, participants were asked on a 0% to 100% 
probability scale: How sure are you about your choice? In the event that a participant is 
randomized into the intuitive condition/identity prime condition where the option begs a 
preference reversal, the choice should be conceptually difficult and this difficulty will be 
reflected in this item.  At the end of the demographic section, the decision problems were 
presented again, and a list of approximately 14 problem related values were listed in random 
order and respondents were asked to rate on a 10-point Likert scale from 1-not at all important to 
10-extremely important, how important each of these values were to them (e.g., flat appearing 
chest, if male; erectile function; body-identity congruence).  
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 RESULTS 
Sample 
 In this study, N=934 participants consented to participate in the survey.  Demographic 
data was not available for N=325 (35%) of the sample due to a technology failure of the survey.  
As a whole, the sample had a mean age = 22.3 ± 7.5 [range: 18-72].  Participants were non-
transgender males (20%), non-transgender females (73%), and 1% knew that they were intersex 
at birth. About one quarter of the sample identified as transgender, and among the transgender 
respondents, nearly all (94%) had been born female, but currently identified as men or as boys. 
This oversampling of transmen (and undersampling of transwomen) is due in large part to 
community access. It is very difficult to survey transwomen if the investigator is not a 
transwoman, or if the investigator does not otherwise have strong community connections. Thus, 
in the analyses that follow, the transgender group is a transman gender group. This grouping is 
validated using the Hoffman Gender Scale. 
Male respondent’s total Hoffman Gender Scale score was high for the male/masculine 
scale (4.9) and low for the female/feminine scale (1.4).  In contrast, female’s total Hoffman 
Gender Scale score was low for the male/masculine total scale (1.4) and high for the 
female/feminine total scale (5.0).  Tukey HSD tests revealed that male and female total scores 
were significantly different at the p < .001 level for each of the male/masculine and 
female/feminine scales including the Hoffman total scores, Hoffman self-definition subscales, 
and Hoffman self-acceptance subscales.  Transgender respondents scored a mean of 4.4 on the 
male/masculine total scale and a mean of 1.8 on the total female/feminine scale.   Similar trends 
were found for the gender self-definition and self-acceptance subscales (Table 1).  Although the 
mean scores appear very similar for males and transgender respondents, Tukey HSD tests 
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 revealed that transgender respondent scores were significantly different at the p < .001 from 
both males and females for each of the male/masculine and female/feminine scales with one 
exception; there was no difference in transgender and male respondent scores on the Hoffman 
total female/feminine score.  Thus, these data suggest that the transgender group is a distinct 
gender group for the purpose of analysis.  Also, because Hoffman gender scale scores trend 
towards the male/masculine self-identification and self-acceptance range, for the remainder of 
the description of results, the transgender respondents as a group will be referred to as transmen. 
Among the N=612 participants for whom ethnicity data is available, most (N=441, 72%) 
were White, N=73 (12%) were Asian, N=45 (7%) were Mixed, N=26 (4%) were Black, and 
N=26 (4%) were Hispanic or Latino.  Of the N=882 participants for whom highest education 
level is available, N=626 (71%) completed a high school diploma, N=143 (16%) completed a 
Bachelor’s degree, N=77 (9%) completed a Master’s degree, and N=30 (3%) completed a 
doctorate or professional degree. It is important to note that these trends may not reflect 
population demographics due to oversampling at the University level.  In addition, as reflected in 
the demographics table (Table 1), the transmen are older and more educated on average than the 
non-transgender men and women in this sample.  Thus, I control for education level and age as 
covariates in the analyses of variance models where appropriate.  
Among the N=612 participants for whom sexual identity data is available, most (N=508, 
83%) identified as heterosexual. To assess sexual attractions, participants were instructed to 
“Please fill in the blank with a number between 0 and 100% representing how often it applies to 
you within the past month. Your totals should add up to 100%.” Then with three separate 
statements, participants were asked to complete the statement, “My attractions towards 
[MEN/WOMEN/TRANSGENDER or GENDER QUEER people] is approximately ___%.”  
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 Among the N=775 participants (83% of the total sample) who provided sexual 
attraction ratings, participants overall reported relatively high mean attractions towards men 
(63%), followed by attractions towards women (31%), and some reported attractions towards 
transgender and/or gender queer persons (4%).  About one-third of the sample (31%) reported 
exclusive attractions towards men (i.e., reported 100% attractions towards men rated on a 
continuous scale from 0 to 100%). Approximately 15% reported exclusive attractions towards 
women, and zero participants reported exclusive attractions towards transgender or gender queer 
persons. Interestingly, although a majority of the sample identified as heterosexual, and only 
N=27 participants reported labeling their sexual orientation as bisexual or pansexual, 43% of this 
study’s participants reported having non-exclusive attractions towards men (reported a frequency 
between and not including zero and 100%); 43% reported non-exclusive attractions towards 
women, and 19% reported non-exclusive attractions towards transgender persons.  The summary 
of sexual attractions by gender group are summarized in Table 1.   
To assess sexual behaviors, participants were instructed to “Please fill in the blank with a 
number between 0 and 100% representing how often it applies to you within the past month. 
Your totals should add up to 100%.” Then with three separate statements, participants were 
asked to complete the statement, “I engage in sexual behaviors with 
[MEN/WOMEN/TRANSGENDER or GENDER QUEER people] is approximately ___%.” 
Among the N=775 participants who provided sexual behavior ratings, participants overall, 
reported engaging in most sexual behaviors with men (52%), followed by women (26%), and 
transgender and/or gender queer persons (3%).  Nearly half of the sample (N=360, 47%) reported 
engaging in exclusive sexual behaviors with men.  About one quarter (N=182, 23%) reported 
engaging in exclusive sexual behaviors with women, and N= 15 (2%) reported exclusive sexual 
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 behavior with transgender and gender queer persons.  About 10% (N=78) of the participants 
who provided data for this question reported engaging in non-exclusive sexual behaviors with 
men.  About three-quarters (N=593, 77%) reported engaging in non-exclusive sexual behaviors 
with women, and about 3% (N=27) reported engaging in non-exclusive sexual behaviors with 
transgender or gender queer persons.  Table 1 summarizes the demographic information for this 
sample.  
Standard dual process manipulation check 
Manipulation check data (N=77) confirmed that the pictures of the pandas evoked 
significantly greater mean affective reactions than the dots (mean picture rating = 6.5; mean dot 
rating = 2.9), t(75) = 8.40, p < .001.  Data also confirmed that the mean emotional appeal was 
significantly greater for the panda pictures than the dots (mean picture appeal = 5.7; mean dot 
appeal = 3.0), t(75) = 5.68, p < .001. 
In the larger sample, the dots yielded a pattern of scope-sensitivity; mean donations were 
significantly greater for four dots versus one dot (M(four dots) = $24.80, SD = $12.10 and 
M(one dot) = $19.70, SD = $11.20),  t(140) = -2.60, p = .01.  In contrast, the panda pictures 
yielded scope-insensitivity.  Mean donations were the same across the two scope levels (M(four 
pandas) = $20.60, SD = $12.10 and M(one panda) = $20.40, SD = $10.60), t(139) = -.07, ns. 
However, the scope x presentation interaction missed significance, F(1, 279) = 3.26, p = .07, 
MSE = 430, !2 = 0.01. Although this interaction missed significance, data trended in the 
expected direction.  In the low magnitude condition, when shown only one panda, participants 
donated slightly (but not significantly) more than in the dot condition, ns. In contrast, in the high 
magnitude condition when shown four pandas, participants donated less than in the than in the 
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 dot condition.  In other words, participants were more sensitive to variations in scope when 
presented with  distinctions among dots, but responded to pandas  categorically.  
Gist manipulation check 
 To examine the effect of cognitive manipulation on choice, participants in the gist 
conditions (N=313) answered the question, “For you, what does this choice boil down to?  In 
other words, for YOU, what is the gist of this decision?” in an open-ended question.  A random 
sample of 50 participant responses were coded for each of the decision vignettes.  In the 
gynecomastia vignette, 67% of respondents (N=28/42) reported that the gist of the decision 
boiled down to a choice between identity versus risk.  Some example responses for this gist in 
the gynecomastia problem include, “breast vs. risk,” “How important is it for me to care about 
future disease than to cut off my body parts,” and “remove the breasts and have all the dangerous 
side effects of any surgery or do a non invasive treatment that is annoying to deal with in daily 
life, but is much safer.” Another gist reported for the gynecomastia vignette included less vs. 
more risk (n=9); for example, “It comes down to the amount of risk in the procedure, which is 
very low in this case.” One participant reported that the gist was a choice between “breast vs. no 
breast,” and three respondents reported that the gist came down to quality of life, including 
statements such as simply it boils down to “quality of life,” or  that it’s a “Quality of life issue, 
chest compression decreases quality of life.” Eight people did not provide a gist response.   
In the gender transition scenario, 84% of respondents (n=31/37) also reported that the gist 
of the decision boiled down to a choice between identity versus risk; some specific response 
examples include, “binding vs. surgery risk,” “is the risk of surgery worth the cosmetic outcome 
or is the safer alternative better in a case where there are no physical bodily harm left as is,” “It 
would boil down to how uncomfortable I felt in my body and the size of the risk factor,” and “I 
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 would rather take the risk then live in a body that does not resemble what it should.”   Five 
respondents reported that the gist of the choice boiled down to less vs. more risk, for example, 
“certain unpleasant side effects in not really solving the problem v. very small chance of side 
effects for full treatment,” and “The severity of the symptoms are important.”  Thirteen people 
did not provide a response. There is no interrater reliability for these codings as there were no 
secondary investigators or research assistants for this study.  
Decision problems 
The four decision problems were coded for the purpose of analysis by problem gender 
orientation (2: man, not man) and by problem natal sex (2: natal female, not natal female). 
Problem gender orientation refers to the direction of the identity preserving choice (favoring a 
gender identity as a man or not favoring a gender identity as a man).  For example, the 
protagonist in the gynecomastia and female-to-male gender transition vignettes are each male 
identified.  Thus, the direction of the identity preserving choice favors the option that preserves 
the male identity of the protagonist (e.g., mastectomy to remove the breast tissue). In contrast the 
protagonist in the breast cancer problem is female identified; thus the identity preserving choice 
for her is breast conserving surgery, or the choice option that is not identity preserving for a man.  
Although the protagonist in the prostate cancer scenario is male identified, both of the 
choice options in this vignette are threatening for the protagonist; in other words there is no clear 
identity preserving choice regardless of the protagonists gender identity orientation or natal sex.  
The choice options are either “hormone therapy” or “prostatectomy.”  For this vignette, the study 
participant must decide which is the lesser threatening option of the two available choices.  As 
stated in the prostate cancer vignette, the side effects of hormone therapy include breast 
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 enlargement and erectile dysfunction. In addition, although the prostatectomy will remove the 
cancerous tumor for sure, this option is paired with a chance of death. 
Thus, across all four decision problems, for the 2(problem gender orientation) x 
2(problem natal sex) vignette design for the purpose of analysis, the gynecomastia problem has a 
clear identity preserving choice that favors a man gender orientation, and the protagonist is not a 
natal female.  In contrast, the breast cancer problem does not have an identity preserving choice 
that favors a man gender orientation, and the protagonist is a natal female.  In the gender 
transition problem, the protagonist has a clear identity preserving choice that favors a man 
gender orientation, but the protagonist is also a natal female; and in the prostate cancer problem, 
there is no clear identity preserving choice for a man gender orientation, and the protagonist is 
not a natal female. 
Standard dual process manipulation on choice 
Table 2 presents the ANOVA results for choice.  A 2(problem gender orientation: man, 
not man) x 2(problem natal sex orientation: female, not female) x 2(magnitude: low, high) x 
2(dual process condition: calculation, feeling) x 2(gender: man, woman) repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of male problem gender orientation (p<.001). 
Overall, participants picked the identity preserving option more in the man gender problems 
(75%) than in the non-man problem gender orientations (50%).  In other words, respondents 
overall chose the mastectomy option more often in both the gynecomastia and gender transition 
problems than the identity preserving or less threatening option in the other two problems (breast 
cancer and prostate cancer, respectively), Figure 1.  
The model also revealed significant interactions for problem gender orientation x 
problem natal sex orientation, problem natal sex x dual process condition, problem gender 
47 
 orientation x dual process condition x gender, and problem gender orientation x magnitude x 
gender.  
In the problem natal sex orientation x standard dual process condition 2-way interaction, 
the data revealed a crossover interaction F(1, 256) = 5.441, p = .02 (Figure 2).  More specifically, 
respondents overall chose the identity preserving options for the non-natal female problems (e.g., 
mastectomy in the gynecomastia problem and prostatectomy in the prostate cancer problem) 
more often in the calculation dual process condition than in the feeling condition, but chose the 
identity preserving options in the natal female problems (e.g., mastectomy in the gender 
transition problem and lumpectomy in the breast cancer problem) more in the feeling condition 
than in the calculation condition.  Post hoc tests confirmed that the difference between dual 
process conditions for the mean gynecomastia and prostate choices was the only comparison that 
approached significance for this interaction (p=.05).  
In the man gender problem orientation x female natal sex problem orientation 2 way 
interaction the mean difference of identity preserving choices was larger between the 
gynecomastia (82%) and prostate cancer problems (41%), p < .001, than between the gender 
transition (67%) and breast cancer problems (59%), ns, Figure 3.  In addition, despite being the 
same problems except for the reason for surgery, respondents selected the identity preserving 
option (mastectomy) significantly more in the gynecomastia problem than in the gender 
transition problem, p < .001.  Also, identity preservation is more effective than avoiding a lesser 
of two threatening choices.  As seen here, respondents selected the identity preserving options 
more often when there was a clear choice to preserve the self (mastectomy for gynecomastia, 
mastectomy for gender transition, and lumpectomy for breast cancer, rather than to avoid the 
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 greater of two identity threatening choices (hormone therapy vs. prostatectomy for prostate 
cancer, p < .001 for each comparison to the prostate cancer problem. 
In the man problem gender orientation by dual process condition by participant gender 3-
way interaction, there is a gender difference across the male problems (gynecomastia and gender 
transition) in the calculation condition (women = 82%, men = 66%, p = .01) but not in the 
feeling condition (men = 76%, women = 76%, ns).  There is no gender difference in the non-
male problem gender orientations (breast cancer and prostate cancer) across conditions (Figure 
4).  Also, men choose the identity preserving options more in the male gender orientation 
problems (gynecomastia and gender transition) compared to the non-male gender orientation 
problems (prostate cancer and breast cancer) in the feeling condition (p < .001), but there is no 
significant difference in men’s identity preserving choices across problem gender orientation in 
the calculation condition.  Women, in contrast choose the identity preserving option more in the 
male gender orientation problems than the non-male gender orientation problems, regardless of 
which dual process condition they were assigned (p < .001 for each condition). 
In the man problem gender orientation by magnitude by participant gender 3-way 
interaction, there is a gender difference across the male problems (gynecomastia and gender 
transition) in the low magnitude condition (women = 80%, men = 62%, p = .003) but not in the 
high magnitude condition (men = 80%, women = 78%, ns).  There is no gender difference in the 
non-male problem gender orientations (breast cancer and prostate cancer) across magnitudes 
(Figure 5).  Also, men choose the identity preserving options more in the male gender orientation 
problems (gynecomastia and gender transition) compared to the non-male gender orientation 
problems (prostate cancer and breast cancer) in the high magnitude conditions (p = .001), but 
there is no significant difference in men’s identity preserving choices across problem gender 
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 orientation in the low magnitude conditions.  Women, in contrast choose the identity 
preserving option more in the male gender orientation problems than the non-male gender 
orientation problems, regardless of which magnitude condition they were assigned (p <.001 for 
each magnitude condition). 
Although respondents picked the identity preserving option slightly more in the high 
magnitude (66%) than the low magnitude (60%) dual process condition, the repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed that this difference is not significant; in other words magnitude missed 
significance (p=.08).  
Means also demonstrated the trend that women selected the identity preserving option 
slightly more (67%) than men (59%) in the natal female oriented problems (breast cancer, gender 
transition), and males selected the identity preserving options slightly, but not significantly more 
(63%) than women (61%) in the non-natal female oriented problems (gynecomastia, prostate 
cancer), but the ANOVA revealed that this two-way interaction for female natal sex problem 
orientation by gender also missed significance (p = .08).  
Finally, although the gender by standard dual process condition by magnitude interaction 
also missed significance (p = .07), the mean trends were consistent with standard dual process 
predictions. For instance, men and women chose the identity preserving option more in the high 
magnitude (men = 71%, women = 66%) than the low magnitude (men = 52%, women = 64%) 
conditions when primed with the calculation standard dual process manipulation.  In contrast, 
trends showed equal identity preserving choices across magnitudes for both genders in the 
feeling conditions. 
Standard dual process manipulation on signed confidence 
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 A 2(problem gender orientation: man, not man) x 2(problem natal sex orientation: 
female, not female) x 2(magnitude: high, low) x 2(standard dual process condition: calculation, 
feeling) x 2(gender: man, woman) repeated measure ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of male problem gender orientation (p < .001) and a significant 2-way interaction of male 
problem gender orientation by participant gender (p = .04) that qualified the main effect.  Table 3 
summarizes the ANOVA results for the standard dual process manipulation on signed 
confidence. 
Consistent with the choice effects in this experiment, the signed confidence effects 
revealed that, overall, respondents showed the strongest preference for the identity preserving 
option in the male gender problem orientations (gynecomastia, gender transition; mean signed 
confidence = 40.6) than in the non-male problem gender orientations (mean signed confidence = 
-1.3), Figure 6.  Moreover, in the male problem gender orientation by participant gender 
interaction, women showed a significantly greater preference than men (mean signed confidence 
women = 47.6, men = 33.5, p = .02) for identity preserving choices in the male gender 
orientation problems. 
The signed confidence model also revealed three interactions that missed significance, 
but displayed means in the predicted directions.  A two-way interaction of natal female sex by 
magnitude missed significance (p = .07), but shows that respondents displayed a stronger 
preference for the identity preserving options in the non-natal female problems (gynecomastia 
and prostate cancer) in the higher magnitude condition (mean signed confidence = 28.7) than in 
the low magnitude condition (mean signed confidence = 13.2), but did not show a preference 
difference for the natal female problems (breast cancer, gender transition) across the magnitude 
conditions (mean signed confidence high magnitude = 18.3, low magnitude = 18.4).  
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 A three-way interaction of male gender problem orientation by dual process condition 
by respondent gender (p = .07) missed significance, but showed similar predicted patterns to the 
gender differences observed in significant identity preserving choice preference across the male 
problems (gynecomastia and gender transition) in the calculation condition (mean signed 
confidence women = 51.9, men = 29, p = .03) but not in the feeling condition (men = 37.9, 
women = 43.3, ns).  Preference ratings between genders were equal across the non-male gender 
problem orientations (breast cancer and prostate cancer) across conditions.  Also, data patterns 
showed that men choose the identity preserving options more in the male gender orientation 
problems (gynecomastia and gender transition) compared to the non-male gender orientation 
problems (prostate cancer and breast cancer) in the feeling condition (mean signed confidence 
male problems = 37.9, non-male problems = -8.1, p < .001), but there were no differences in 
men’s identity preserving choice preferences across problem gender orientation in the calculation 
condition (mean signed confidence male problems = 29.0, non-male problems = 8.7).  Women, 
in contrast choose the identity preserving option more in the male gender orientation problems 
overall than the non-male gender orientation problems, regardless of which dual process 
condition they were assigned (calculation condition: mean signed confidence in the male gender 
problems = 51.9, non-male problems = -3.5; feeling condition: mean signed confidence male 
gender problems = 43.3, non-male problems = -2.3).  
Another three-way interaction of male gender problem orientation by female natal sex 
problem orientation by magnitude missed significance.  Looking at the descriptive data across 
magnitude, respondents showed a preference for the identity preserving choice in the 
gynecomastia, transition, and breast cancer problems, but not in the prostate cancer problem.  
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 The data patterns reveal that the preference for the identity preserving choices were greater in 
the higher magnitude condition than in the low magnitude condition. 
Fuzzy-trace theory manipulation on choice 
Table 4 presents the ANOVA results for the fuzzy trace manipulation effects on choice. 
A 2(problem gender orientation: man, not man) x 2(problem natal sex orientation: female, not 
female) x 2(gist prime: yes, no) x 2(identity prime: yes, no) x 3(gender: man, woman, transman) 
repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice revealed a significant main effect of 
problem gender orientation (p < .001).  The model also revealed significant interactions for 
problem gender orientation x gender, problem natal sex orientation x gender, problem natal sex 
orientation x gist prime, problem natal sex orientation x identity prime, and problem gender 
orientation x problem natal sex orientation x gender.  
Overall, participants picked the identity preserving option more in the male gender 
problems (81%) than in the non-male gender problems (39%).  More specifically, in the 
gynecomastia problem respondents chose the identity preserving option (mastectomy = 76%) 
more than the identity threatening option (binding = 17%; n=3 (7%) missing).  In the gender 
transition problem respondents also chose the identity preserving option (mastectomy = 69%) 
more than the identity threatening option (binding = 22%; n=3 (9%) missing), Figure 7. 
In the man gender problem orientation x gender 2-way interaction, the mean difference in 
identity preserving choices across male problem gender orientation was larger among transman 
respondents than the difference between either men or women F(2, 821) = 46.04, p < .001; 
(Figure 8).  More specifically, the mean proportion difference for choosing the identity 
preserving option among transmen was 67%, whereas among men the mean difference was 29%, 
and among women the mean difference was also 29%.   
53 
 Transmen chose the identity preserving option (mastectomy) in the man gender 
orientation problems (gynecomastia, gender transition) 93% of the time, and this was 
significantly more than both men (76%, p < .001) and women (73%, p < .001).  In the non-man 
gender orientation problems (breast cancer, prostate cancer), transmen chose the identity 
preserving option (lumpectomy in the breast cancer problem; prostatectomy in the prostate 
cancer problem) significantly less overall (26%) than both men (47%, p < .001) and women 
(44%, p < .001) overall.  Post hoc tests revealed no significant differences between men and 
women in either the male problem gender orientation or the non-male problem gender 
orientation. 
In the female natal sex problem orientation x respondent gender 2-way interaction, the 
mean difference in identity preserving choices across natal female problem orientation was larger 
among transmen (16%) than the difference among either men (2%) or women (9%) overall, F(2, 
821) = 46.04, p < .001; (Figure 9).  More specifically, transmen chose the identity preserving 
options (lumpectomy; mastectomy) in the natal female gender orientation problems (breast 
cancer; gender transition, respectively) 52% of the time, and this was significantly less than 
women (63%, p < .001), but not significantly different from men (60%, ns).  In the non-natal 
female problems (gynecomastia; prostate cancer), transmen chose the identity preserving option 
(mastectomy in the gynecomastia problem; prostatectomy in the prostate cancer problem) 
significantly more overall (68%) than women (54%, p < .001), but not significantly different 
from men (62%, ns) overall.  There was a significant difference between men’s and women’s 
identity preserving choices in the non-natal female problems (p = .02), but there was no 
significant difference between men and women’s identity preserving choices in natal female 
problem orientations. 
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 In the female natal sex problem orientation x gist prime 2-way interaction, the mean 
difference in identity preserving choices across natal female problem orientation was larger 
among respondents when they did not receive the gist manipulation (mean difference = 7%, p < 
.01) than when they did receive the gist manipulation (mean difference = 0%, ns), F(1, 821) = 
3.81, p = .05; (Figure 10).  Moreover, although there was no difference across gist prime (57% 
no gist prime; 59% yes gist prime) for overall proportion of identity preserving choices in the 
natal female problem orientations (lumpectomy in the breast cancer problem; mastectomy in the 
gender transition problem), respondents chose the identity preserving option significantly less 
when they received a gist prime (59%) than when they did not receive the gist prime (64%), p = 
.02.  
In the female natal sex problem orientation x identity prime 2-way interaction, the mean 
difference in identity preserving choices across natal female problem orientation (lumpectomy in 
the breast cancer problem; mastectomy in the gender transition problem) was significantly larger 
among respondents when they did receive the identity manipulation (mean difference = 6%, p = 
.01) than when they did not receive the identity manipulation (mean difference = 0%, ns), F(1, 
821) = 3.72, p = .05; (Figure 11).  But, post hoc tests revealed no significant differences between 
identity prime conditions for proportion of identity preserving choices within either the natal 
female problem orientations (no identity prime = 59%; yes identity prime = 57%) or the non-
natal female problem orientations (no identity prime = 59%; yes identity prime = 63%). 
In the man gender problem orientation x female natal sex problem orientation x gender 
three-way interaction, respondents chose the identity preserving option at varying proportions 
depending on the decision problem, F(2, 821) = 43.78, p < .001; (Figure 12).  For example, in the 
gynecomastia problem (man gender, non-natal female sex orientation), transmen chose the 
55 
 identity preserving option significantly more (92%) then both men (81%, p = .02) and women 
(76%, p < .001); the difference between men and women’s identity preserving choices for the 
gynecomastia problem were not statistically significant.   
In the gender transition problem (man gender, natal female sex orientation), transmen 
chose the identity preserving option significantly more (95%) then both men (71%, p < .001) and 
women (70%, p < .001); the difference between men and women’s identity preserving choices 
for the gender transition problem were not statistically significant.   
In the prostate cancer problem (non-man gender, non-natal female sex), women 
respondents chose the identity preserving option significantly less (32%) then both men (43%, p 
= .03) and transgender (44%, p = .01) respondents; the difference between men and transmen’s 
identity preserving choices for the prostate cancer problem were not statistically significant.   
In the breast cancer problem (non-man gender, natal female sex orientation), transmen 
chose the identity preserving option significantly less (9%) then both men (50%, p < .001) and 
women (55%, p < .001); the difference between men and women’s identity preserving choices 
for the breast cancer problem were not statistically significant. 
After controlling for age and education level as covariates in the 2(problem gender 
orientation: man, not man) x 2(problem natal sex orientation: female, not female) x 2(gist prime: 
yes, no) x 2(identity prime: yes, no) x 3(gender: man, woman, transgender) repeated measure 
ANOVA on choice, data revealed similar effects in the predicted directions as in the 
uncontrolled model.  First, data revealed a main effect of male problem orientation, whereby, 
respondents overall chose identity preservation more in male problem orientations (81%) than in 
non-male problem orientations (39%).   
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 Second, as before, a two-way interaction of male problem orientation by participant 
gender emerged with a divergent pattern. HSD tests revealed that within each gender group 
(men, women, transmen) there is a significant difference across problem orientation (p < .001 for 
each gender group across man vs. non-man problem orientation), whereby identity preservation 
is selected more often among the man problem orientations than among the non-man problem 
orientations, but the difference between problem orientations is the smallest among men (mean 
difference = 29%) and women (mean difference = 30%), followed by a significantly larger 
difference among transmen (mean difference = 66%). HSD tests showed that transmen, make 
significantly more identity preserving choices than men (mean difference = 17%, p < .001) and 
women (mean difference = 19%, p < .001) in the man problem orientations, and make 
significantly less identity preserving choices than both men (mean difference = 20%, p < .001) 
and women (mean difference = 17%, p < .001) in the non-man problem orientations.  
Third, data revealed another two-way interaction of natal female problem orientation and 
participant gender whereby the mean difference in identity preserving choices across natal 
female problem orientations was smallest amongst men (mean difference = 1%, ns), followed by 
women (mean difference = 8%, p< .001), and largest amongst transmen (mean difference = 17%, 
p < .001). HSD tests also revealed that transmen selected the identity preserving option 
significantly less than both men (mean difference = 9%, p < .001) and women (mean difference 
= 11%, p < .001) in the natal female problem orientations, but significantly more than women 
(mean difference = 14%, p < .001) in the non-natal female problem orientations. There was no 
difference in proportion of identity preserving choices between men and transmen in the non-
natal female problem orientations, and men also chose the identity preserving option 
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 significantly more than women (mean difference = 7%, p = .03) in the non-natal female 
problem orientations. 
The three-way interaction described below qualifies the three effects described above.  In 
sum, respondents overall selected the identity preserving option more in the man problem 
orientations (gynecomastia and gender transition); however, transmen selected the identity 
preserving option significantly more than both men (gynecomastia mean difference = 12%, p < 
.001; gender transition mean difference = 22%, p < .001) and women (gynecomastia mean 
difference = 16%, p < .001; gender transition mean difference = 23%, p < .001).  In fact, 
transmen selected the identity preserving option nearly 100% of the time for each man-oriented 
problem (gynecomastia = 93%; gender transition = 94%).  There was no significant difference 
between men and women’s proportions of identity preserving choices for both the gynecomastia 
and gender transition problems.  The inverse pattern was observed in the breast cancer problem. 
Transmen selected the identity preserving option only 10% of the time for the breast cancer 
problem, significantly less than both men (50%, p < .001) and women (56%, p < .001). HSD 
tests revealed no difference between men and women’s proportions of identity preserving 
choices for the breast cancer problem. Finally, men and transmen reported similar proportions of 
identity preserving choices for the prostate cancer problem (44% and 45%, respectively, ns), and 
women selected the identity preserving choice significantly less than both men (mean difference 
= 11%, p = .04) and transmen (mean difference = 12%, p = .01) for the prostate cancer problem.   
In sum, although transmen as a group were more educated and older on average than both 
men and women in this sample, after controlling for age and education level in the model, there 
was no change in the results. Patterns of identity preserving choices emerged in the predicted 
directions. 
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 Fuzzy-trace theory manipulation on signed confidence 
A 2(problem gender orientation: man, not man) x 2(problem natal sex orientation: 
female, not female) x 2(gist prime: yes, no) x 2(identity prime: yes, no) x 3(gender: man, 
woman, transgender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence revealed a significant 
main effect of male problem gender orientation (p < .001) and a significant main effect of female 
natal sex problem orientation (p < .001).  The model also revealed significant interactions for 
problem male gender orientation x gender (p < .001), problem natal sex orientation x gender (p < 
.001), problem natal sex orientation x gist prime (p = .03), and male gender problem orientation 
x female natal sex problem orientation x participant gender (p < .001).  Table 5 presents the 
ANOVA results for fuzzy-trace theory manipulation on signed confidence.  The model also 
revealed a two-way interaction for problem natal sex orientation x identity prime that missed 
significance (p = 08), and a male gender problem orientation by respondent gender by gist 
interaction that missed significance (p = .06). 
Overall, respondents showed a strong significant preference for identity preserving 
choice in the man gender orientation problems (gynecomastia, gender transition; mean signed 
confidence = 54.4) than in the non-male gender orientation problems (breast cancer, prostate 
cancer; mean signed confidence = -20.3), Figure 13.  Moreover, respondents showed a small but 
stronger preference for identity preserving choices in the non-natal female problem orientations 
(prostate cancer, gynecomastia; mean signed confidence = 22.2) than in the natal female problem 
orientations (breast cancer, gender transition; mean signed confidence = 11.9), Figure 14. 
The male gender problem orientation by participant gender two-way interaction revealed 
that the mean difference in choice preferences as measured by signed confidence was 
significantly larger among transmen than either men or women.  More specifically, in the male 
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 gender problem orientations (gynecomastia, gender transition) transmen showed the greatest 
preference for identity preserving choices (mastectomy in both cases; mean signed confidence = 
83.8) over men’s (mean signed confidence = 41.1, p < .001) and women’s (mean signed 
confidence = 38.4, p < .001) preferences.  There was no statistically significant difference 
between men’s and women’s identity choice preferences in either the male gender problem 
orientations (gynecomastia, gender transition) or the non-male problem orientations (breast 
cancer, prostate cancer), Figure 15.  In the non-man problem orientations, transmen showed a 
stronger but moderate preference for the identity threatening choices (mastectomy in the breast 
cancer problem, and hormone therapy in the prostate cancer problem; mean signed confidence = 
-44.1) compared to both men (-6.4) and women (-10.5) respondents (p < .001). 
The natal female sex problem orientation by participant gender two-way interaction 
revealed a crossover effect between men and women in their identity preserving preferences 
across problems whereby men displayed stronger identity preserving preferences (mean signed 
confidence = 20.0) than women (mean signed confidence = 10.4) over all the non natal female 
problems (gynecomastia and prostate cancer), but women displayed stronger identity preserving 
preferences (mean signed confidence = 17.5) than men (mean signed confidence = 14.7) in the 
natal female oriented problems (breast cancer, gender transition), Figure 16.  Moreover, 
transmen showed a similar pattern to men across natal female problem orientation, but to a 
greater degree.  The mean difference across problem type was significantly greater among 
transmen than either men (p < .001) or women (p < .001).  More specifically, transmen report 
significantly greater preference (mean signed confidence = 36.2) than both men and women for 
the identity preserving options in the non-natal female problems (mastectomy in gynecomastia; 
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 prostatectomy in prostate cancer), and show significantly less identity preserving preferences 
(mean signed confidence = 3.5) in the natal female oriented problems. 
In the two-way significant interaction of natal female problem orientation by gist prime 
respondents showed a greater difference in identity preserving preferences between the problems 
when they did not receive a gist prime (mean difference = 12.9) than when they did (mean 
difference = 4.7).  More specifically, respondents overall displayed stronger identity preserving 
preferences in the non-natal female problems (mastectomy for gynecomastia, and prostatectomy 
for prostate cancer; mean signed confidence = 25.8) than in the natal female problems 
(lumpectomy for breast cancer, mastectomy for gender transition; mean signed confidence = 9.9) 
when they did not receive a gist prime.  However, when respondents received a gist prime, the 
preferences across problems were not significantly different (natal female mean signed 
confidence = 13.9, non-natal female mean signed confidence = 18.6), Figure 17. 
The three-way interaction of man gender problem orientation by female gender problem 
orientation by participant gender, the data qualify the main effect of male gender problem 
orientation and the two-way interaction of male gender problem orientation by participant gender 
F(2, 753) = 70.97, p < .001.  Again, here data reveal that all three gender groups have stronger 
identity preserving preferences in the male gender problem orientations (Figure 18), but the three 
way interaction highlights that the transmen are driving the higher order effects.  More 
specifically, transmen show greater identity preserving preferences (mastectomy) in the 
gynecomastia (mean signed confidence = 78.6) and gender transition problems (mean signed 
confidence = 89.1) compared to men (gynecomastia mean signed confidence = 50.7; gender 
transition mean signed confidence = 31.5) and women (gynecomastia mean signed confidence = 
44.6; gender transition mean signed confidence = 32.2).  Transmen also show significantly 
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 greater identity threat preferences (mastectomy) in the breast cancer problem (mean signed 
confidence = -82.1) than both men (mean signed confidence = -2.0) and women (mean signed 
confidence = 2.8). 
Natal female problem orientation by identity manipulation on signed confidence missed 
significance.  However, the means show patterns consistent with predictions.  More specifically, 
the differences in identity preserving preferences were larger when respondents received an 
identity prime (mean difference = 14.7) than when they did not receive an identity prime (mean 
difference = 2.9). 
Man gender problem orientation by participant gender by gist on signed confidence also 
missed significance, but although the data show the same patterns as the significant two-way 
interaction of male problem by participant gender, there is a trending crossover by gist condition 
in the male gender problems between men and transmen.  In other words, in the man gender 
problem orientations (gynecomastia and gender transition), men show slightly more identity 
preserving preferences (mastectomy) when they received a gist prime (mean signed confidence = 
45.4) than when they did not (mean signed confidence = 36.9), whereas transgender participants 
showed the opposite pattern; transgender participants showed slightly more identity preserving 
preferences when they did not receive the gist prime (mean signed confidence = 89.3) than when 
they did receive a gist prime (mean signed confidence = 78.3); women showed no difference 
across male gender problem orientation whether they received a gist prime (mean signed 
confidence = 38.5) or not (mean signed confidence = 38.3). 
After controlling for age and education as covariates, a 2(problem gender orientation: 
man, not man) x 2(problem natal sex orientation: female, not female) x 2(gist prime: yes, no) x 
2(identity prime: yes, no) x 3(gender: man, woman, transgender) repeated measure ANOVA on 
62 
 signed confidence revealed no major changes in the results. There was a significant main effect 
of male problem gender orientation (p < .001).  The model also revealed significant interactions 
for problem male gender orientation x gender (p < .001), problem natal sex orientation x gender 
(p < .001), problem natal sex orientation x gist prime (p = .03), and male gender problem 
orientation x female natal sex problem orientation x participant gender (p < .001).   
After controlling for age and education, overall, data revealed that respondents showed a 
strong significant preference for identity preserving choice in the man gender orientation 
problems (gynecomastia, gender transition; mean signed confidence = 54.5) than in the non-male 
gender orientation problems (breast cancer, prostate cancer; mean signed confidence = -19.2).  
After controlling for age and education, there was no longer a significant main effect of female 
problem orientation (prostate cancer, gynecomastia).  
The male gender problem orientation by participant gender two-way interaction revealed 
that the mean difference in choice preferences as measured by signed confidence was 
significantly larger among transmen than either men or women.  More specifically, in the male 
gender problem orientations (gynecomastia, gender transition) and after controlling for age and 
education, transmen showed the greatest preference for identity preserving choices (mastectomy 
in both cases; mean signed confidence = 82.5) over men’s (mean signed confidence = 42.1, p < 
.001) and women’s (mean signed confidence = 39.0, p < .001) preferences.  There was no 
statistically significant difference between men’s and women’s identity choice preferences in 
either the male gender problem orientations (gynecomastia, gender transition) or the non-male 
problem orientations (breast cancer, prostate cancer).  In the non-man problem orientations, 
transmen showed a stronger but moderate preference for the identity threatening choices 
(mastectomy in the breast cancer problem, and hormone therapy in the prostate cancer problem; 
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 mean signed confidence = -41.2) compared to both men (-6.7) and women (-9.8) respondents 
(p < .001). 
As before, the natal female sex problem orientation by participant gender two-way 
interaction revealed a crossover effect between men and women in their identity preserving 
preferences across problems whereby men displayed stronger identity preserving preferences 
(mean signed confidence = 19.9) than women (mean signed confidence = 11.0) in the non natal 
female problems (gynecomastia and prostate cancer), but women displayed stronger identity 
preserving preferences (mean signed confidence = 18.2) than men (mean signed confidence = 
15.6) in the natal female oriented problems (breast cancer, gender transition).  Moreover, 
transmen showed a similar pattern to men across natal female problem orientation, but to a 
greater degree and with a larger mean difference across problem orientation.  The mean 
difference across problem type was significantly greater among transmen than either men (p < 
.001) or women (p < .001).  After controlling for age and education, transmen reported 
significantly greater preferences (mean signed confidence = 37.9) than both men and women for 
the identity preserving options in the non natal female problems (mastectomy in gynecomastia; 
prostatectomy in prostate cancer), and showed significantly less identity preserving preferences 
(mean signed confidence = 3.5) in the natal female oriented problems. 
In the two-way significant interaction of natal female problem orientation by gist prime, 
participants showed a greater difference in identity preserving preferences between the problems 
when they did not receive a gist prime (mean difference = 16.0) than when they did (mean 
difference = 4.9).  Participants displayed stronger identity preserving preferences in the non-natal 
female problems (mastectomy for gynecomastia, and prostatectomy for prostate cancer; mean 
signed confidence = 26.3) than in the natal female problems (lumpectomy for breast cancer, 
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 mastectomy for gender transition; mean signed confidence = 10.3) when they did not receive a 
gist prime.  However, when respondents received a gist prime, the preferences across problems 
were not significantly different (natal female mean signed confidence = 14.6, non-natal female 
mean signed confidence = 19.5). 
The three-way interaction of man gender problem orientation by female gender problem 
orientation by participant gender, qualifies the main effect of male gender problem orientation, 
as well as the two-way interaction of male gender problem orientation by participant gender and 
the two-way interaction of natal female sex problem orientation by participant gender.  Again, 
here, after controlling for age and education, the data reveal that all three gender groups have 
stronger identity preserving preferences in the male gender problem orientations (similar pattern 
as in Figure 18), but the three way interaction highlights that the transmen are driving the higher 
order effects.   
Transmen show greater identity preserving preferences (mastectomy) in the 
gynecomastia (mean signed confidence = 78.8) and gender transition problems (mean signed 
confidence = 86.3) compared to men (gynecomastia mean signed confidence = 50.7; gender 
transition mean signed confidence = 33.5) and women (gynecomastia mean signed confidence = 
44.9; gender transition mean signed confidence = 33.0).  Transmen also show significantly 
greater identity threat preferences (mastectomy) in the breast cancer problem (mean signed 
confidence = -79.3) than both men (mean signed confidence = -2.3) and women (mean signed 
confidence = 3.4). 
Comparing fuzzy-trace theory to standard dual process theory 
A 2(man problem orientations: man oriented vs. not) x 2(natal female problem 
orientation: natal female vs. not) x 2(participant gender: man, woman) x 3(dual process 
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 condition: control, fuzzy-trace theory, standard dual process) repeated measures ANOVA on 
choice revealed main effects of male problem orientation and natal female problem orientation.  
This model also revealed two significant interactions and one interaction that missed 
significance.  There was a significant two-way interaction of natal female problem orientation 
and participant gender as well as a significant two-way interaction of male and female problem 
orientations.  A three-way interaction missed significance for participant gender by male 
problem orientation by dual process condition.  Table 6 summarizes the statistics for the 
significant and missed significance effects from this model.  
The main effects of man problem orientation and natal female problem orientations 
revealed the same patterns as described in each dual process analysis above.  Respondents 
selected the identity preserving options more in the male problem orientations (gynecomastia and 
gender transition) than in the non man problem orientations (breast cancer, prostate cancer).  
Respondents also selected the identity preserving options more, overall, in the natal female 
problems (breast cancer, gender transition) than in the non-natal female problems (gynecomastia, 
prostate cancer).   
The two-way interaction of male problem orientation by natal female problem orientation 
demonstrates an effect of each decision problem on choice for respondents overall, and qualifies 
the main effects for both male problem orientation and female problem orientation.  More 
specifically, respondents select the identity preserving choice most often in the gynecomastia 
problem (77%), followed by the gender transition problem (70%), then the breast cancer problem 
(54%), and least often in the prostate cancer problem (37%).  
The two-way interaction of natal female problem orientation by participant gender 
qualifies the main effect of natal female problem orientation in that the difference between mean 
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 identity preserving choices across the natal female problems is limited to women respondents.  
More specifically, whereas men show no difference in identity preserving choices between the 
natal female (59%) and non-natal female problems (59%), women select the identity preserving 
option 11% more often in the natal female problem orientations (65%) than in the non-natal 
female problem orientations (54%), F(1, 624) = 23.03, p < .001. 
A three-way interaction for participant gender by male problem orientation by dual 
process condition missed significance, but revealed choice patterns in the predicted directions.  
More specifically, compared to not receiving a dual process manipulation, men chose the identity 
preserving option more when they received a dual process manipulation and when the problem 
was a self-gender mismatch (men making choices in the non-male oriented problems).  Men 
showed no differences in identity preserving choices across dual process conditions in the gender 
matched problems.  Moreover, women showed no differences in identity preserving choices in 
both male and non male problem orientations whether they received a dual process manipulation 
or not. 
In sum, after comparing the standard dual process and fuzzy-trace theory conditions in 
the same model, the data do not suggest that one dual process condition is a better predictor of 
identity preserving choice over the other when compared to the control condition. Rather 
problem type and participant gender identity were stronger predictors of identity preserving 
choices. 
Values 
 Table 7 summarizes the group means for each gender group by problem.  Overall, for the 
breast cancer problem the mean importance ratings for the “surviving cancer” value (mean = 
9.23) and for the “cancer recurrence” value (mean = 8.76) were rated the highest.  Several other 
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 values received greater than neutral ratings for the whole sample including “surgical risks” 
(mean = 6.69), “living in the wrong body for your gender identity” (mean = 6.29), “having a flat 
chest if you are male” (mean = 6.08), “pain” (mean = 5.96), “being able to hide your breasts if 
you are male” (mean = 5.93), “my identity as female, or as a woman” (mean = 5.87), and “my 
identity as male, or as a man” (mean = 5.74).  
 Overall, for the prostate cancer problem the mean importance ratings for the “surviving 
cancer” value (mean = 9.13) and the “cancer recurrence” value (mean = 8.84) were rated the 
highest.  Several other values received greater than neutral ratings for the whole sample 
including “my identity as male, or as a man” (mean = 7.14), “surgical risks” (mean = 7.04), 
“disability” (mean = 6.83), “conserving erectile function” (mean = 6.75), “pain” (mean = 6.22), 
“having a flat chest if you see yourself as male” (mean = 6.14), “being able to hide your breasts 
if you are male” (mean = 6.12), and “living in the wrong body for your gender identity” (mean = 
6.03). 
 Overall, for the gynecomastia problem the highest ranked values included “surviving 
cancer” (mean = 7.63), “my identity as male, or as a man” (mean = 7.52), “having a flat chest if 
you see yourself as male” (7.33), “cancer recurrence” (mean = 7.31), “being able to hide your 
breasts if you are male” (mean = 7.20), “surgical risks” (mean = 7.01), and “living in the wrong 
body for your gender identity” (mean = 6.60).  The value “enlarged breasts” rated slightly higher 
than neutral (mean = 5.79), but there was very low importance given to the value “conserving the 
breast” (mean = 3.79) in the gynecomastia scenario. 
Overall, for the gender transition problem the highest ranked values included “living in 
the wrong body for your gender identity” (mean = 7.86), “my identity as male, or as a man” 
(mean = 7.74), “having a flat chest if you see yourself as male” (mean = 7.44), “surgical risks” 
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 (mean = 6.93), and “being able to hide your breasts if you are male” (mean = 6.81).  The value 
“my identity as female, or as a woman” rated just below neutral (mean = 4.52), and there was 
very low importance given to the value “conserving the breast” (mean = 3.70) in the gender 
transition scenario. 
 A 3 (gender) x 2 (gist prime) x 2 (identity prime) repeated measures ANOVA on each of 
the value ratings relevant to the trade offs for each problem was conducted.  Table 8 summarizes 
the results of the ANOVA analyses.  In sum, data repeatedly revealed a main effect of gender, a 
main effect of decision problem, and a two-way interaction of gender by decision problem.    
Confirming the descriptive trends summarized above, the repeated measures ANOVA on 
surgical risk value ratings revealed that, overall, females rated the surgical risk value as 
significantly more important (mean = 7.5) than either males (mean = 6.6) or transmen (mean = 
5.2).  Moreover, whereas males and females rated a greater concern for surgical risk in the 
gender transition decision problem then in the other three problems (breast cancer, prostate 
cancer, or gynecomastia), transmen rated the concern for surgical risk as least important in the 
gender transition problem compared to each of the other three decision problems. 
The main effect of problem for the repeated measures ANOVA on cancer recurrence 
validates that the value ratings for cancer recurrence was rated significantly higher in the two 
cancer decision problems (breast cancer mean = 8.7; prostate cancer mean = 8.7) than in the non-
cancer problems (gynecomastia mean = 7.1; gender transition mean = 6.1). 
The two-way interaction of gender by problem for the repeated measures ANOVA on 
conserving the breast value ratings reveals that the concern for preserving the breast was rated as 
most important in the breast cancer decision problem, but that the value rating was highest 
among females (mean = 6.3), followed by males (mean = 5.3), and rated as least important by 
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 transmen (mean = 1.9). As expected, value ratings for preserving the breast were less important 
for all of the man oriented decision problems (prostate cancer, gynecomastia, and gender 
transition). 
The two-way interaction of gender by problem for the repeated measures ANOVA on 
conserving erectile function value ratings reveals that the concern for preserving erectile function 
was rated as most important in the prostate cancer decision problem, but that the value rating was 
highest among males (mean = 7.6), followed by females (mean = 6.6), and rated as neutral 
importance by transmen (mean = 5.8). As expected, value ratings for preserving erectile function 
were less important for all of the other decision problems, which did not report any threat to 
erectile function.  
Table 9 summarizes the spearman bivariate correlations of the value ratings and choice 
across each of the four decision problems. For the breast cancer scenario, there is a strong and 
significant positive correlation between choosing the identity preserving option (breast 
conserving surgery) and higher reported value ratings for conserving the breast (r = .62). There is 
also a moderately strong, significant, positive correlation between choosing breast conserving 
surgery and one’s identity as female or as a woman (r = .28).  The correlation results also 
revealed that respondents with greater values for surgical risks also significantly more often 
selected breast conserving surgery (r = .14).  
In the breast cancer scenario there is a moderately strong, significant negative correlation 
between choosing the identity preserving option (breast conserving surgery) and reported value 
ratings for cancer recurrence (r = - .24), having a flat chest if you see yourself as male (r = - .22), 
living in the wrong body for your gender identity (r = -. 16), surviving cancer (r = - .15), my 
identity as male or as a man (r = -.13), and being able to hide your breasts if you are male (r = - 
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 .12). In other words, as participants chose the identity preserving option more in the breast 
cancer scenario, the value ratings were lower for cancer recurrence, for having a flat chest if you 
see yourself as male, for living in the wrong body for your gender identity, for my identity as 
male or as a man, and for being able to hide your breasts if you are male. 
For the prostate cancer scenario, there is a significant positive correlation between 
choosing the lesser identity threatening choice option (prostatectomy) and the value ratings for 
having a flat chest if you see yourself as male (r = .18), being able to hide your breasts if you are 
male (r = .14), one’s identity as male or as a man (r = .12), enlarged breasts (r = .12), and living 
in the wrong body for your gender identity (r = .10).  There is a significant negative correlation 
between choosing prostatectomy and the value ratings for surviving cancer (r = -.15) and cancer 
recurrence (r = -.14). In other words, as participants chose the prostatectomy option, the value 
ratings were lower for surviving cancer, and cancer recurrence. 
For the gynecomastia scenario, there is a strong significant positive correlation between 
choosing the identity preserving option (mastectomy) and value ratings for having a flat chest if 
you see yourself as male (r = .31), being able to hide your breasts if you are male (r = .27), and 
my identity as male or as a man (r = .25). There were also significant positive correlations 
between choosing mastectomy and higher value ratings for living in the wrong body for your 
gender identity (r = .16), and feeling uncomfortable in the warmer seasons (r = .10).  There is a 
strong, significant negative correlation between choosing mastectomy and value ratings for 
surgical risk (r = -.26). Significant, negative correlations also emerged between choosing 
mastectomy and the value ratings for conserving the breast (r = -.15), pain (r = -.12), and 
disability (r = -.11). In other words, the more respondents chose mastectomy in the gynecomastia 
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 scenario, the lower their value ratings were for surgical risk, breast conservation, pain, and 
disability. 
In the gender transition scenario, there is a strong significant positive correlation between 
choosing the identity preserving option (mastectomy) and value ratings for having a flat chest if 
you see yourself as male (r = .31), being able to hide your breasts if you are male (r = .27), and 
my identity as male or as a man (r = .25). There are also significant positive correlations between 
choosing mastectomy and the value ratings for living in the wrong body for your gender identity 
(r = .16), and feeling uncomfortable in the warmer seasons (r = .10).  
Similar to the gynecomastia problem, in the gender transition scenario, significant 
negative correlations emerged for choosing the identity preserving option (mastectomy) and the 
value ratings for surgical risk (r = -.29), conserving the breast (r = -.21), my identity as female or 
as a woman (r = -.17), pain (r = -.13), and disability (r = -.13). In other words, as respondents 
chose mastectomy, their value ratings decreased for surgical risk, breast conservation, female 
identity, pain, and disability. 
In sum, the results of these analyses suggest that gender identity is a protected value as 
evidenced by noncompensatory decision making across medical decision making scenarios that 
involve a trade-off between identity and risk.  Although dual process manipulations did not 
predict variations in identity preserving choices, decision problem gender orientation and 
participant gender identity did predict identity preserving choices.  The context of the decision 
problem matters a great deal, and proportions of identity preserving choices were higher amongst 
man oriented problems than in non-man oriented problems.  In general, decisions were in line 
with participant values.  Identity preserving choices were attenuated somewhat when life and 
death values were made salient in the decision problem, but identity preserving choices were the 
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 highest when social norms were threatened, such as with the male-identified protagonists in the 
gynecomastia problem in which a male is described as having developed breasts and participants 
are asked to decide whether to choose surgery to remove the excess tissue or to choose a 
compression vest. 
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 DISCUSSION 
Summary of findings: Identity as a protected value 
The purpose of this study was to examine how people process conflicts between gender 
identity and risk when making medical decisions.  This was accomplished by presenting 
participants with dichotomous choices that contrasted gender identity preserving options that 
carried greater risks against gender identity threatening options that carried lower risks across a 
variety of decision scenarios.  Consistent with predictions, the results suggest that despite the 
elevated risks, gender identity preservation was often more important to participants than the 
risk.  Moreover, the gender groups responded differently to the identity threats across the 
decision scenarios.  Although several of the groups were able to empathize with the motivation 
to protect one’s gender identity across a variety of threatening situations, as predicted, 
participants were more sensitive to protecting gender identity in the decision scenarios where the 
protagonist’s gender matched their own gender identity.  
These results are also consistent with predictions of protected values found in the 
literature (Baron & Ritov, 2008; Tetlock, 2003).  Protected values are typically personal values 
or moral principles that are protected from trade-offs with other values (Baron & Ritov, 2008) or 
social norms (Tetlock, 2003).  In this study, participants were frequently not willing to 
compromise the integrity of their gender identity in discordance with social norms.  Thus, in 
addition, these results provide new evidence for protected values that go beyond just moral 
reasoning; as predicted, this study presents new evidence for gender identity as a protected value.  
In support of hypothesis 1c and 2f, although the data did not reveal a main effect of 
identity prime, the data did reveal a main effect of gender and an interaction between gender and 
decision problem, which suggests that the protected identity effect varies both by gender group 
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 and by problem context.  In the current study, when there is a protagonist-participant gender 
identity match, respondents showed more identity preserving choices than in decision contexts 
representing a protagonist-respondent gender mismatch.  In other words, in this study, male 
respondents reported more frequent identity preserving choices across the problems in which the 
identity preserving option favored man gender identity orientations (gynecomastia, gender 
transition), but choose the identity preserving option only about half as often in non-man 
problem gender orientations (breast cancer, prostatectomy).  
Among transmen, this pattern was even more pronounced. Transmen selected the identity 
preserving option nearly 100% of the time in man-oriented problems, and only 26% of the time 
in non-man oriented problems. Interestingly, though, women in this study showed a similar 
choice pattern across problems as men. That is, although the three way interaction of gender 
identity orientation by natal female problem orientation by gender showed that women selected 
the identity preserving option more often than either men or transmen in the breast cancer 
problem (gender-match), women also selected the identity preserving option nearly three-
quarters of the time in man problem orientations (which represent a gender-mismatch).  
To explain this choice pattern among women, it is important to note that across several of 
the problems the choice proportions across were close to or greater than 50%, which suggests 
that even in protagonist-respondent gender mismatch situations, respondents, in general, were 
still able to empathize with the protagonist’s dilemma; and when asked to put themselves in the 
protagonist’s situation, respondents chose the identity preserving option because there is a strong 
preference for the identity preserving option even in hypothetical decision scenarios that may not 
be personally relevant.  
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 Empathy has been defined in the literature as “accurately perceiving the internal frame 
of reference of another” (Gold & Rogers, 1995, p. 79).  In the breast cancer scenario, men 
selected the identity preserving choice 50% of the time even though the protagonist was a 
woman (protagonist-gender mismatch).  Also, in the gynecomastia decision scenario, women 
selected the identity preserving option 77% of the time even though the protagonist was a man.  
Transmen, however, did not demonstrate the same degree of mismatch empathy as was observed 
among men and women in this study.  For example, although both males and females chose the 
identity preserving option (breast conserving surgery) approximately 50% of the time in the 
breast cancer scenario, transmen almost never selected the identity preserving option for the 
female protagonist in this decision problem, and in fact selected mastectomy (the identity 
threatening option) in this decision problem nearly 100% of the time.  It is possible that because 
transmen spend more time than non-transgender males and females negotiating their own gender 
conflicts in society, they are less able to separate their own choices from that which might be 
more important to the protagonist in the scenario.  
The transmen in this study are natal-females who report masculine or male gender 
identities.  Moreover, prior research suggests that cross-gender identified transmen often elect to 
remove their own breasts to feel a sense of authentic identity achievement (Pardo, 2008; Riggle, 
Rostosky, McCants, & Pascale-Hague, 2011).  Thus, transmen would reject any action that 
would preserve their own breasts.  In other words, it is possible that given the heightened 
salience of their own gender identities as transmen, the transgender respondents in this study 
were less able to empathize with the female in the breast cancer scenario and thus did not select 
the identity preserving option for the protagonist.   
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 Alternatively, perhaps the lower proportions of identity preserving choices in the breast 
cancer scenario is in part due to an over-identification among transmen as men, thus resulting in 
even less empathy than non-transgender men when compared to women in a woman-oriented 
decision scenario.  In two studies testing the effect on empathy of having a similar prior 
experience, Batson and colleagues (1996) found that after observing a same-sex peer endure 
mild, but uncomfortable electric shocks, women who had also experienced this condition 
reported the highest levels of empathy, while men regardless of whether they had experienced 
this condition or not reported less empathy.  This finding was replicated in a hypothetical 
scenario where respondents read a transcript of an upsetting life experience.  Again, women who 
had a similar experience as that described in the transcript reported the highest levels of empathy 
for the protagonist in the transcript, and men reported less empathy regardless of whether they 
had experienced a similar upsetting life experience or not.  Thus, if transmen reflect similar 
empathy patterns as males in general, data would show less empathy among transmen than 
women, but it remains an empirical question whether transmen are over-identifying as men, and 
whether as such they display hypoempathy in contexts involving multigender comparisons. 
Moreover, despite the data presented here, it is also possible that because of their lived 
experiences with constant gender conflict, transmen might be more empathetic to gender threats. 
A search of the empirical literature revealed a dearth of literature on transgender empathy.  In 
fact, a web of science search with keywords “transsexual” or “transgender” and “empathy” 
produced only two published articles, only one of which was a social science publication (the 
other was a publication that examined themes of racial and gendered identities as performed 
through the experimental art projects of the diasporic London-based artist-led group moti roti).  
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 In a qualitative investigation of the positive aspects of transgender identification, 
Riggle and colleagues (2011) found that participants reported “increased empathy” and having “a 
unique perspective on both sexes” (p. 150) as positive aspects to being transgender.  In fact, 
among over 60 study participants, over one-quarter of the sample indicated that “a transgender 
identity allowed them to experience increased empathy for others” (p. 151).  One participant 
reflected that being a transman forced him to think about stereotyping, and to have greater 
empathy for marginal groups (although this anecdote is not conclusive).  Perhaps it is this latter 
form of empathy that explains why an overwhelming number of transmen selected mastectomy 
(the identity threatening option) over breast conserving surgery (the identity preserving option) 
in the breast cancer scenario; that is, perhaps the transmen have a greater range of what is 
considered acceptable gender presentations, and perhaps they were less threatened in general by 
the idea of a woman with a flat chest following a mastectomy.  It follows then that if transmen 
are less threatened in general by gendered presentations that are outside of societal norms, 
perhaps their attention in the breast cancer scenario was cued more by the risk of cancer than the 
risk of appearing gender discordant. This remains an open empirical question for future 
investigation. 
The data also suggest that the protected identity effect may also be context dependent.  
Although the data did not reveal a main effect of identity prime, data did reveal a significant 
interaction effect of identity prime by natal female problem orientation.  More specifically, when 
respondents received an identity prime, they showed differential choice patterns across problems, 
but did not show differential choices across the problems when they did not receive an identity 
prime.  Thus, heightening the salience of participants’ identities seemed to accentuate the 
sample’s differential choice patterns across the vignettes. 
78 
 The results of this study are not easily explained by approaches such as  expected utility 
theory. There are two key dimensions to calculating an expected value or utility: probability and 
magnitude of the outcome. For example, am I willing to play a chance game if I have a 50% 
chance of winning $10? The expected utility of this game is .50 x $10 or $5. Thus, by definition, 
expected utility is both multiplicative and scope sensitive. To keep a constant expected value, 
there is an inverse relationship between probability and the magnitude of the payoff; in other 
words, if my odds of winning decrease to 10%, the magnitude of the payoff must increase to $50 
to maintain an equal expected value.  Greater risk requires greater reward to make it worth the 
gamble. In this study, however, across the various types of problems, study participants were 
repeatedly not willing to trade off the protection of gender identity for less risk, even when 
responding to gender mismatched, hypothetical scenarios.  More specifically, in one problem 
(prostate cancer), over 40% of respondents were willing to incur a small chance of death in order 
to avoid a greater threat to the protagonists’ gender identity.  
Prior research identify protected values as when individuals are quantity insensitive, that 
is, when people are not willing to make a trade-off no matter how high the reward (Bartels & 
Medin, 2007; Ritov & Baron, 1999).  In other words, sometimes there is no quantitative amount 
one could buy, sell, or trade for that would motivate the respondent to give up the protected 
value. Applied to this study, participants demonstrate this sort of noncompensatory decision 
behavior about protecting identity against the threat of risk, even when the risk is a small chance 
of death.  
In sum, the current findings demonstrate that gender identity is a protected value and that 
identity, as a protected value, predicts noncompensatory decision making in dilemmas that 
involve a trade-off.  More specifically, the current findings demonstrate that gender identity is a 
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 predictor of self-preserving decision making in gender relevant medical contexts even when 
the identity preserving context involves greater risk than an alternative choice.  These data also 
provide an empirical test of two dual process cognitive manipulations, standard dual process 
theory and fuzzy-trace theory, in the same experimental paradigm that tests noncompensatory 
decision making.   
Standard dual process theory 
Although, analyses revealed a significant crossover interaction for standard dual process 
condition by problem type, contrary to expectations, respondents in the calculation standard dual 
process condition did not seem to make their choices based on the expected utility of the 
outcomes.  Rather the expected effect was only observed in the prostate cancer problem, which 
explicitly paired the identity preserving option with a chance (albeit a low chance) of certain 
death within ten years.  Moreover, it is possible that the expected effect for this one problem was 
not particularly due to the standard dual process calculation prime, but rather due to an 
overwhelming aversion to a risk of death over and above the higher identity threat alternative of 
erectile dysfunction and male breast development.  Although data revealed a three way 
interaction of problem type by standard dual process condition by gender, closer examination of 
the data suggest that the pooled means across the problems even when split by gender are also 
due to the pooled means that included the prostate cancer problem, where again, participants may 
have been more risk averse to the chance of death in the identity preserving option than simply 
rejecting the greater identity threat in the alternative.  
The literature on omission bias provides some context for understanding this strange 
finding.  Omission bias is “the preference for harm caused by omissions over equal or lesser 
harm caused by acts” (Baron & Ritov, 2004, p. 74).  In one study, participants were asked to 
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 make a choice whether to vaccinate their only child with a new vaccine against a virulent flu.  
Similar to the prostate cancer scenario in the current study where the prostatectomy option states 
that the surgery will completely remove the cancer, but that there is a chance of recurrence that 
could lead to death, Baron and Ritov’s participants were told that the vaccine “completely 
prevents the flu, but it sometimes causes side effects that can be fatal” (Baron & Ritov, 1994, p. 
491).  Results demonstrated that even at very small fatality risk estimates of 1 in 10,000, less 
than 50% of participants were willing to accept the vaccine against the virulent flu.  
Although similar results emerged in this study as in Baron and Ritov (1994), there are 
methodological differences that still leave more to be examined.  The choice options presented in 
Baron and Ritov’s experiment were between an action (choosing the vaccine) and an inaction 
(not having the vaccine); whereas in the present study, participants were choosing between two 
unequal actions – one of which threatened a male gender identity by carrying a significant risk of 
breast development and a smaller risk of erectile dysfunction, and the other of which carried one 
small risk, albeit a risk of death.  Thus, this study is not a direct comparison to a test of omission 
bias which pits an inactive against an active choice.  However, the choice trends among 
participants suggest that as seen in tests of omission bias, the risk of death is likely weighted 
more than other risks – even protected values.  
Somewhat in line with predictions, participants selected the identity preserving option 
more than half the time when they received the feeling prime, but contrary to expectations, there 
were mostly no gender difference across problem type.  Both men and women selected the 
identity preserving options more in the man gender oriented problems (gynecomastia and gender 
transition) than in the non-man gender oriented problems (breast cancer and prostate cancer).  
Again, this effect could have been due to the low identity preserving choices in the prostate 
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 cancer problems, in which participants may have been showing a general aversion to even a 
small risk of death.  
A slightly different interpretation of the problem by standard dual process condition 
crossover effect suggests that respondents are overall more sensitive to biological male identity 
threats (and thus selected the identity preserving option more often in the gynecomastia and 
prostate cancer problems) when primed to reason by calculation, but respondents are conversely 
more sensitive overall to biological female identity threats (and thus selected the identity 
preserving option more often in the breast cancer and gender transition problems) when primed 
to reason by feeling.   
The literature on gender nonconformity describes that,gender nonconforming youth, 
especially boys who do not display the normative range of masculine dress style or behaviors by 
Western societal standards, typically endure an atmosphere of intimidation in their daily lives 
(Reis & Saewyc, 1999).  Moreover, anti-gay bullying often originates from judgments about 
gender expression rather than sexual orientation (Reis & Saewyc, 1999; D’Augelli, Pilkington, & 
Hershberger, 2002).  Harassment may be used as a means of aggressively reinforcing a particular 
style of masculinity (Tharinger, 2008); and whereas gender nonconforming (tomboy) girls 
benefit from being the “best athletes” or other stereotypically masculine traits, gender 
nonconforming boys frequently bear intense harassment and discrimination (Brooks, 2000; 
Remafedi, Farrow, & Deisher, 1994).  This literature, however, does not explain why 
respondents would show a greater sensitivity to identity threat in the natal female oriented 
problems when randomized to the feeling condition.  Thus, further research is warranted to 
examine this difference more carefully. 
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 We do know from the available literature, however, that prior research with dual 
process manipulations has demonstrated reversals in decision making (Mills, Reyna, Estrada, 
2008).  In particular, when cued to use verbatim processing, participants’ risk perceptions 
positively correlated with  risk taking, whereas when cued to use gist processing, participants’ 
risk perception  negatively correlated with risk taking ; high perception of the gist of risk, in turn, 
was associated with more risk-avoidant behaviors.  In addition, judgment research that tested the 
influence of affect found that positive emotions lead to risk aversion while negative emotions 
such as anger resulted in risk seeking (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004).  Thus, as affect is made 
more salient, regardless of valence, participants display reliance on those emotions when making 
decisions, which may lead to differential emphasis on the utility (weighed risks vs. benefits) of 
the outcome and thus different choices (Mano, 1992).  
Applied here, the three-way interaction of problem gender orientation by standard dual 
process condition by participant gender revealed that when primed to calculate, men selected the 
identity preserving option about 16% less often then women across the man-oriented problems 
(gynecomastia and gender transition), but when primed to use feeling, the gender differences in 
response patterns for the gynecomastia and gender transition problems disappeared. It is possible 
that, similar to the behavioral patterns observed in Mills et al, (2008), when primed to use 
analytical processing, men were more attentive to the quantitative risk comparisons between the 
two choices, and chose the option that had a better quantitative risk profile (less quantitative 
risk), and were less attentive to the more affective-based, identity threat.  Indeed, when primed to 
evaluate by feeling, men showed similar proportions of identity preserving choices as women.  
Moreover, when primed with the feeling cognitive manipulation, men selected the identity 
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 preserving option 10% more often in the man-oriented problems (gynecomastia and gender 
transition) than when primed with the calculation cognitive manipulation.  
Prior research supports this pattern.  Mano (1992) tested how affect influences decision 
making and found that when primed to experience distress (via negative affect induction 
techniques), participants engaged in simpler decision strategies and formed more polarized 
judgments.  According to fuzzy-trace theory, simpler, affective-based decision strategies are an 
eample of gist processing, and thus, applied here, may result in greater proportions of identity 
preserving choices; this was confirmed in the present study. 
Fuzzy-trace theory 
Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that when using gist processing, individuals think 
automatically, effortlessly, based on experience, expertise, and in line with their personal values.  
It was predicted that if identity is an experience-based, and value-based construct, then when 
primed to use gist representations for the decision problems, respondents should select the choice 
in line with the protagonist’s identity; in other words, the fuzzy-trace theory models should 
reveal a main effect of gist whereby respondents will choose the identity preserving options more 
overall across problems when they receive a gist prime over when they do not.  However, it is 
possible that survival was a more fundamental value to participants. 
Contrary to predictions, there was no main effect of gist, but there did emerge an 
interaction of gist by problem type.  When participants did not receive a gist prime, they 
displayed differential choice patterns, whereby they selected the identity preserving option more  
in the non-man oriented problems (prostate cancer and breast cancer) than the man-oriented 
problems (gynecomastia and gender transition).  However, this difference was eliminated when 
participants received a gist prime.  These data suggest that participants were responding to the 
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 identity threats differentially across problem when not primed to consider the gist of the 
choices, but when respondents received a prompt to consider what the decision boiled down to, 
the gist prime may have equalized the preference for identity preservation across problems.  
It is interesting, though not surprising, that gist equalized the differential response pattern 
across problems for identity preserving choices.  According to fuzzy-trace theory, gist 
representations are vague and capture the bottom-line meaning of information (Mills et al, 2008; 
Reyna & Farley, 2006).  Thus, in contrast to verbatim representations (which focus on the literal 
surface details of the information presented), gist allows for a subjective interpretation of 
information through a variety of individual lenses including those of experience, emotion, 
education, culture, and identity.  
As an example of the kind of subjective flexibility gist provides when interpreting 
medical risk and how an individual’s own identity-based processing plays a role in decision 
making, Reyna (2008) discusses a scenario where a 49-year-old woman calculates her lifetime 
breast cancer risk as 22.2% using an online risk estimation tool.  On a likelihood scale from 0% 
(not likely at all) to 100% absolutely likely, 22.2% is less likely to occur than even by chance at 
50%.  However, given that the average risk for a 49-year-old woman is only 11.3%, then this 
woman is about twice as likely than any other woman her age to be diagnosed with breast cancer.  
In discussing the gist of the risk, the woman’s contextual and individual factors play a great role 
in how she interprets her lifetime risk estimate.  These contextual and individual factors may 
include, education (or how well she deals with numbers, or numeracy), her interpretation of her 
own physical health and well being, or whether she has young dependents, for example, who 
may still require her long term care and attention.  In this study, age and education differences 
did not explain the differential choice patterns across the problems.  However, gender identity 
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 was a significant predictor, suggesting that individually-based differences (that is, differences 
rooted in who one is) had an effect on participants’ choices. 
Gist, then, as a subjective, meaning-based construct allows individuals with similar 
principles to draw similar meanings across contexts even if the surface form of the information 
in the context might be different.  For example, as in this study, when presented with two 
identical medical decision scenarios with the same treatment options (e.g., mastectomy vs. chest 
compression) that are differentiated only by reason for surgery (e.g., gynecomastia vs. gender 
transition), all participants in this study demonstrated with their responses that they understood 
that the gist was the same for each protagonist in these two medical scenarios.  In other words, 
the protagonist in the gynecomastia problem as in the gender transition problem each identify as 
a man, even though the former was born biologically male and the latter was born biologically 
female.  Thus, the identity preserving option in both scenarios is to select mastectomy to remove 
the breast.   
In contrast, when presented with a third similar scenario that pits breast conservation 
against breast removal, but for a female protagonist whose gender identity is congruent with her 
birthsex and who must make a decision after being diagnosed with breast cancer, participants 
should produce the opposite choice pattern if the gist of the scenario is well understood.  In other 
words, according to fuzzy-trace theory, if study participants consider that the meaning of the 
decision for the female protagonist is to preserve a natural component of her identity as a 
woman, study participants should reverse their choices and select lumpectomy over mastectomy 
for the woman in this scenario.  Among men and women, although the signed confidence results 
did not demonstrate a strong choice preference, both men and women selected the identity 
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 preserving option at least half of the time. These results are consistent with the predictions of 
fuzzy-trace theory. 
Among transmen, who almost never selected the identity preserving option for the 
protagonist in the breast cancer scenario, it is possible that as experts in rejecting their own natal 
sex as female, they were more sensitive to their own identity principles than empathetic to the 
protagonist in the scenario.  Therefore, although the transmen in this study showed strong 
identity preserving preferences in the male oriented problems, consistent with their own 
identities over that of the protagonist in the decision scenario, transmen choose mastectomy more 
often than the identity preserving option of lumpectomy for the protagonist in the breast cancer 
scenario. Alternatively, perhaps merely being asked to rate what one would do in a hypothetical 
scenario involving another person’s perspective is enough to create greater variations in rates of 
identity preserving choices.  For example, similar to research based on fuzzy-trace theory’s gist 
processing, research examining the effects of psychological or social distance suggests that self-
other differences might be explained by differences in knowledge, experience, or perspective-
taking (Libby & Eibach, 2002; Trope & Liberman, 2010).  First, regarding knowledge, people 
generally know more about themselves then others.  Second, people often pay more attention to 
situational contexts rather their own specific behaviors; the latter, is more salient from a third-
person perspective (Libby & Eibach, 2002).  Thus, when participants are asked to imagine 
themselves in a scenario, and to make a decision from a first-person perspective, research 
suggests that participants engage more vivid imagery of the decision details and may engage in 
more cost-benefit and analytical processes, in other words, missing the forest for the trees.  
Applied to this study, it is possible that the hypothetical nature of the decision problems and the 
type of perspective taking led to greater analytical processing among participants for whom there 
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 was a protagonist-participant gender mismatch.  That is, men and transmen may have engaged 
more detail oriented processing for the breast cancer scenario, and consistent with fuzzy-trace 
theory, thereby attenuated their identity preserving choices.  Moreover, although men and 
transmen both had male gender identities, transmen also have personal experience with rejecting 
their natal sex as female.  This additional rejection of the female-self identity may have resulted 
in even more detail oriented processing and a stronger choice preference for mastectomy (the 
threat option) over breast conservation (the identity preserving option). 
Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that gist processing is the more accessible, automatic, default 
type of processing that occurs when people reason in an advanced way (Reyna & Casillas, 2009).  
In this study, the control condition does not provide respondents with a cognitive manipulation; 
thus, if respondents randomized to the control condition in this study are using the most 
accessible and automatic processing, then they are using gist processing when making their 
decisions.  It follows then, that if participants in the control group are using gist processing as a 
default reasoning process, then individuals in the control condition are expected to show similar 
choice patterns as respondents in the gist condition.  In support of this prediction, in this study 
there was no main effect of gist manipulation, suggesting that choice patterns between 
respondents who received a gist prime and those who did not responded with the same identity 
preserving choice proportions.  In applying fuzzy-trace theory to explain similar moral dilemmas 
to the ones presented in this study, Reyna and Casillas (2009) noted that gist processing produces 
insensitivity to quantity, and thus noncompensatory decision making.  
Standard dual process theory vs. Fuzzy-trace theory 
These data provide the first empirical test of two dual process cognitive manipulations, 
standard dual process theory and fuzzy-trace theory, in the same experimental paradigm that tests 
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 noncompensatory decision making.  Overall, the data support some, but not all, of the 
predictions from each of the dual process models tested in this study. This study does extend the 
current literature on the operational components of gist, namely that identity is a component of 
gist processing.  The “protected identity effect” across problem and between respondents of 
varying genders suggests that gender identity as an experience and meaning-based construct is a 
component of gist. This study also raises more questions about how gist processing is different 
from affective processing.  Differential choice patterns emerged between non-transgender men 
and women in this sample when respondents received standard dual process manipulations 
compared to when they received fuzzy-trace theory manipulations.  Most simply, the data 
suggest that gist is different from but inclusive of affect; however further research is warranted to 
examine the mechanisms of gist processing versus affective processing across gendered groups.  
To process a tradeoff that involves a decision between an identity preserving option 
paired with a greater risk against an identity threat option paired with a lesser risk is in part 
determined by one’s gist of the decision and how relevant the decision is to either the person in 
question or to themselves.  Moreover, such a decision involves more than just affect.  Indeed, life 
is full of moral dilemmas and subtle contradictions, and when forced to contemplate trade-offs, 
people become uncomfortable when the choices tug at our sacred values, in particular ones 
pointed at our selves.   In a sense, such decisions require us to give up (or trade-off) a part of 
who we are, and most people are not willing to compromise who they are, even when protecting 
the integrity of the self incurs greater risk.   The data here suggest that fuzzy-trace theory when 
compared to standard dual process theory is a more consistent predictor of the protected identity 
effect.  
Research limitations 
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 The absence of the protected identity effect in the prostate cancer problem was curious.  
However, the literature on omission bias may provide some insight for why the protected identity 
effect did not emerge for the prostate cancer problem (Baron & Ritov, 2009; Cushman, Young, 
& Hauser, 2006).  Specifically, Cushman and colleagues demonstrated that moral principles are 
triggered when a problem evokes thoughts of the decision maker causing more harm with a 
behavior than without.   In this study, the prostate cancer problem was designed, in theory, to 
provoke doing harm to identity integrity to some degree in both choice options, but one choice 
was designed to suggest it offered less threat to the self than the alternative.  Unfortunately, when 
the lesser identity-threat option was paired with even a small risk of “death” as the theoretically 
more identity preserving option, this pairing negated the salience of the lesser threat actually 
being a lesser threat, because identity has no meaning if one is not living.  Future research should 
modify the choice options in this scenario such that the paired risk for the lesser identity 
threatening option is not an absolute risk that triggers alternate core values (e.g., suicide is bad).  
The design of this study also failed to include a third fuzzy trace verbatim condition to 
test how priming of the details of the contrasting options in the decision problem may have 
effected respondent decisions.  This omission paired with a gist effect in the control condition, 
which validates fuzzy-trace theory’s prediction that gist reasoning is a kind of default reasoning 
in adults (Reyna & Casillas, 2009), suggests that there was no alternative to the gist and identity 
prime conditions for this experiment.  Perhaps a more carefully controlled control condition 
and/or the inclusion of a clear verbatim condition would produce a greater range of significant 
effects.  
It was important to run the analysis models after controlling for additional demographic 
variables such as age and education.  Age, for example, had a relatively young mean given the 
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 range of the distribution.  This suggests a right-skew to the data and calls for it to be included 
as a covariate.  Moreover, transmen were slightly older on average than the non-transgender men 
and women in this study.  Previous research exploring developmental differences in framing 
effects has demonstrated age effects (Reyna & Farley, 1994; Reyna et al, 2003); that is, with age, 
people rely more on gist processing than verbatim processing.  However, after controlling for 
both age and education in the repeated measures ANOVA models, the results remained the same.  
Analysis of the control group revealed that the default processing may have been based 
on gist representations, suggesting that a third fuzzy trace verbatim condition (separate from a 
control condition) was required, but missing from this design.  Future research should thus 
reexamine these data considering gist versus verbatim processing versus control for effects on 
identity motivated risky decision making.  Moreover, even though the sample was predominantly 
white, there was a reasonably diverse racial distribution.  Thus, future analyses should also 
confirm these findings with a greater ethnically diverse sample. 
It is important to note that in many experiments there is a trade-off between experimental 
control and external validity.  To further maximize the external validity of this study, the 
decision paradigms presented medical decision scenarios that are prevalent in everyday life. The 
most recent report of national health statistics demonstrated that over 46 million inpatient 
surgical procedures are documented annually (DeFrances, Lucas, Buie, & Golosinskiy, 2006).   
Of these procedures, over 200,000 are breast cancer diagnoses in women, and an additional 
200,000 are prostate cancer diagnoses in men.   Moreover, medical decisions such as those 
involved in cancer treatments often involve identity trade-offs.  Although the decision problems 
were hypothetical in presentation, the decision problems presented realistic medical scenarios, 
decision options, and side effect or prevalence statistics to maximize internal validity.  
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  Despite these notable limitations, this study presents several empirical replications and 
adds new findings to the body of knowledge on risk perception and medical decision making.  
Most notably, it is one of the first studies to explore medical decision making and risk appraisals 
in transgender samples.  Moreover, this study joins a limited body of research that explores 
identity as a significant predictor of risk perception and medical decision making, in particular in 
contexts that involve a core value tradeoff.  
Individuals are typically unwilling to compromise a fundamental aspect of the self (that 
is, some core components of one’s identity) even when the alternative is less risky.  Respondents 
in this study showed differential choices in favor of the identity preserving options when they 
received an identity prime than when they did not.  These results are consistent with the work of 
Ritov and Baron (1999, 2008), who found correlations between protected values and biases of 
omission; that is, respondents were not willing to act in contrast to their moral principles, even 
when the act would “kill some” in order to result in “more lives saved overall.”  In other words, 
when one holds absolute moral principles “thou shalt not kill,” individuals find it more difficult 
to kill some to save more than to not do anything and take a chance that a few will die.  These 
results also draw some similarity to risk aversion in framing paradigms (Reyna & Casillas, 
2009), in which people are willing to take greater risks when a decision problem is framed as a 
potential loss than when it is framed as a gain. 
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 CONCLUSION 
The series of experiments in my dissertation make several unique contributions to the 
current literature.   First, these experiments are the first to test the central concept that identity is 
a protected value.   Second, the experiments test dual process implications for surgical decision-
making.   Third, the experiments test how identity is taken into account in decisions regarding 
risky surgical procedures, especially when there is a trade-off between identity and surgical risk; 
and fourth, because studies often assume similarities across the dual process theories these 
experiments are the first to test for differences in the constructs by evaluating alternative dual 
process models in the same study.  
Using empirically motivated hypothesis-driven research, my dissertation research directly 
addresses a current gap in the empirical literature on protected values. Moreover, the results of 
this study are readily applicable in clinical contexts. Moreover, this research has applications in 
cognitive, social, and developmental psychology. For instance, the current study provides greater 
predictive insight for clinicians working with transgender clients who are contemplating a 
medical transition. The current study may also help clinicians who work with non-transgender 
clients who currently struggle with life course decisions (especially decisions involving an 
important trade-off) that may have a fundamental consequence for the self, such as when a 
patient is diagnosed with cancer.   Thus, in applied settings, this research fills a major gap in the 
current literature on protected values and the role of identity in medical decision making.    
Moreover, although this study is a much needed first step in testing the role of identity in 
medical decision making, further research is warranted regarding the mechanisms for how 
cognitive processes and identity as a protected value interact to motivate judgments and 
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 decision-making, particularly in contexts that involve important health implications such as sex 
reassignment surgeries or cancer surgeries (prophylactic or as post-hoc treatment).    
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 APPENDIX A  
Hoffman Gender Scale Revised Form A: Femininity (14-item) 
Instructions: Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements by 
rating it on the 6-point scale below: 
(1) Strongly Disagree  
(2) Disagree 
(3) Somewhat Disagree 
(4) Somewhat Agree  
(5) Agree 
(6) Strongly Agree 
 
1. When I am asked to describe myself, being female is one of the first things I think of. 
2. I am confident in my femininity. 
3. I meet my personal standards for femininity. 
4. My perception of myself is positively associated with my biological sex. 
5. I am secure in my femininity. 
6. I define myself largely in terms of my femininity. 
7. My identity is strongly tied to my femininity. 
8. I have a high regard for myself as a female. 
9. Being a female is a critical part of how I view myself. 
10. I am happy with myself as a female. 
11. I am very comfortable being a female. 
12. Femininity is an important aspect of my self-concept. 
13. My sense of myself as a female is positive. 
14. Being a female contributes a great deal to my sense of confidence. 
What do you mean by femininity? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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 Hoffman Gender Scale Revised Form B: Masculinity 
Instructions: Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements by 
rating it on the 6-point scale below: 
(1) Strongly Disagree  
(2) Disagree 
(3) Somewhat Disagree 
(4) Somewhat Agree  
(5) Agree 
(6) Strongly Agree 
 
1. When I am asked to describe myself, being male is one of the first things I think of. 
2. I am confident in my masculinity. 
3. I meet my personal standards for masculinity. 
4. My perception of myself is positively associated with my biological sex. 
5. I am secure in my masculinity. 
6. I define myself largely in terms of my masculinity. 
7. My identity is strongly tied to my masculinity. 
8. I have a high regard for myself as a male. 
9. Being a male is a critical part of how I view myself. 
10. I am happy with myself as a male. 
11. I am very comfortable being a male. 
12. Masculinity is an important aspect of my self-concept. 
13. My sense of myself as a male is positive. 
14. Being a male contributes a great deal to my sense of confidence. 
 
What do you mean by masculinity? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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 APPENDIX B 
Note: Highlighted choices mark the predicted choice in the identity prime condition 
 
DECISION PROBLEM #1 (breast cancer) 
 
Preamble: Imagine that at your most recent doctor’s appointment you were found to have early 
stage breast cancer. The cancer has formed in the breast but it has not yet spread. There are two 
contemporary treatment options for treatment of this disease (breast conserving surgery or total 
mastectomy). 
 
If you choose breast conserving surgery, the cancerous tumor will be removed using a small 
incision to preserve the natural breast, but there is a higher risk of cancer recurrence (8-14%). 
 
If you choose mastectomy, the cancer, the surrounding vulnerable tissue, and the breasts will all 
be surgically removed, but there is very little (4%) risk of cancer recurrence. 
 
A) Breast Conserving Surgery. 
 
B) Total mastectomy. 
 
Assuming that whatever option you choose will be provided free of charge, from the above 
available options, which would you choose (pick as if you had to choose one of the above in real 
life)?    
Choice: _________ 
 
What factor(s) influenced your decision?  
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DECISION PROBLEM #2 – PROSTATE CANCER 
 
Preamble: Imagine that you are a man and that at your most recent doctor’s appointment your 
doctor confirmed with a biopsy that you have early stage prostate cancer, and that it is still 
confined to the prostate gland. There are two contemporary treatment options for treatment of 
this disease (hormone therapy and prostatectomy). 
 
If you choose hormone therapy, 62% of cases result in enlarged breasts and 30% of cases result 
in erectile problems. 
 
If you choose prostatectomy the prostate gland and the cancer will be completely removed, but 
there is up to 35% recurrence risk of a more aggressive cancer within 10 years that will kill you 
for sure. 
 
A) Hormone therapy.  
 
B) Prostatectomy. 
 
 
Assuming that whatever option you choose will be provided free of charge, from the above 
available options, which would you choose (pick as if you had to choose one of the above in real 
life)?    
Choice: _________ 
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 DECISION PROBLEM #3 – GYNECOMASTIA (non-cancerous) 
 
Preamble: Imagine that you are a man, and that at your most recent doctor’s appointment your 
doctor confirmed that you have gynecomastia. Gynecomastia is characterized by an overgrowth 
of breast tissue in males. Your doctor tells you that your options are to bind your breasts using a 
chest compression vest or to pursue surgical mastectomy. 
 
If you choose chest compression, you may be able to hide your breasts and there is no immediate 
threat to your health, but you will have to bind every day in order to not appear to have breasts. 
The vest may restrict ease of breathing, may be uncomfortable in the warmer seasons, and there 
is no action to permanently remove the breasts, so there is always the risk that someone will find 
out that your body has breasts. 
 
If you choose a mastectomy, the breast tissue will be permanently removed giving you a flat 
male chest, but there are serious risks including blood loss during surgery, surgical site infection, 
permanent scarring, and anesthesia-related death (1 in 1800 cases). 
 
A) Binding/chest compression vest. 
 
B) Modified mastectomy. 
 
Assuming that whatever option you choose will be provided free of charge, from the above 
available options, which would you choose (pick as if you had to choose one of the above in real 
life)?    
109 
 DECISION PROBLEM #4 – FTM GENDER TRANSITION 
 
Preamble: Imagine that although you were born female, you identify as transgender and 
experience extreme discomfort with being seen as a woman, and you have a strong desire to live 
as a man and be read as male. Your behaviors, thoughts, and dress style preferences differ from 
the societal norms and expectations of women, and you regularly feel like your “trapped in the 
wrong body.” 
 
You are deciding whether (or not) to undergo sex reassignment to live as a male. Your treating 
therapist confirms that you might benefit from sex reassignment, but that the decision to 
transition is completely up to you. Your doctor tells you that your options are to bind your 
breasts using a chest compression vest or to pursue surgical mastectomy. 
 
If you choose chest compression, you may be able to hide your breasts and there is no immediate 
threat to your health, but you will have to bind every day in order to not appear to have breasts. 
The vest may restrict ease of breathing, may be uncomfortable in the warmer seasons, and there 
is no action to permanently remove the breasts, so there is always the risk that someone will find 
out that your body has breasts. 
 
If you choose a mastectomy, the breast tissue will be permanently removed giving you a flat 
male chest, but there are serious risks including blood loss during surgery, surgical site infection, 
permanent scarring, and anesthesia-related death (1 in 1800 cases). 
 
A) Binding/chest compression vest.  
 
B) Modified mastectomy. 
 
Assuming that whatever option you choose will be provided free of charge, from the above 
available options, which would you choose (pick as if you had to choose one of the above in real 
life)?    
Choice: _________ 
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 TABLES 
 
Table 1. Sample Demographics 
 
  MEN (N=187) 
WOMEN 
(N=471) 
TRANSGENDER 
(N=229) TOTAL (N=887)  
AGE (mean ± SD [range]) 21.0±4.7 [18-54] 21.2±6.0 [18-72] 28.2±9.5 [18-62] 22.3±7.5 [18-72] 
BIRTHSEX     
    MALE 185(99%) - 11(5%) 196(21%) 
   FEMALE 2(1%) 466(99%) 215(94%) 683(73%) 
   INTERSEX - 4(1%) 3(1%) 7(1%) 
RACE     
   ASIAN 17(9%) 18(4%) 1(<1%) 73(8%) 
   BLACK 5(3%) 55(12%) 3(1%) 26(3%) 
   WHITE 78(42%) 186(40%) 177(77%) 441(47%) 
   SOUTH AMERICAN/LATINO 3(2%) 7(2%) 7(3%) 17(2%) 
   MEXICAN 
AMERICAN/CHICANO 1(1%) 3(1%) 5(2%) 9(1%) 
   MIXED ETHNICITY 3(2%) 12(3%) 30(13%) 45(5%) 
EDUCATION     
   DID NOT FINISH HIGH 
SCHOOL - - 6(3%) 6(1%) 
   HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA (or 
GED) 81(43%) 211(45%) 96(42%) 388 (42%) 
   BACHELORS 13(7%) 33(7%) 69(30%) 115(12%) 
   MASTERS 8(4%) 26(6%) 37(16%) 71(8%) 
   DOCTORATE or 
PROFESSIONAL 5(3%) 10(2%) 14(6%) 29(3%) 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
LABEL     
   ASEXUAL 7(4%) 5(1%) 10(4%) 12 (1%) 
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    BISEXUAL 4(2%) 15(3%) 12(5%) 19 (2%) 
   GAY 14(8%) 3(1%) 26(11%) 17 (2%) 
   HETEROSEXUAL 124(66%) 384(82%) 30(13%) 508 (54.4) 
   LESBIAN 1(1%) 9(2%) 5(2%) 10 (1%) 
   MAN-AMOROUS - 18(4%) 4(2%) 18 (2%) 
   PANSEXUAL 1(1%) 7(2%) 43(19%) 8 (1%) 
   WOMAN-AMOROUS 14(8%) 2(<1%) 2(1%) 16 (2%) 
   OTHER 1(1%) 3(1%) 25(11%) 4 (<1%) 
SEXUAL ATTRACTIONS              
(mean ± SD [range])     
   MEN  
13.5±31.0 [0-
100] 91.3±20.7 [0-100] 35.1±32.5 [0-100] 62.6±42.8 [0-100] 
   WOMEN 
83.9±33.9 [0-
100] 6.7±16.5 [0-100] 41.4±36.2 [0-100] 30.5±40.5 [0-100] 
   TRANSGENDER .8±4.4 [0-45] 1.0±6.7 [0-90] 18.6±21.5 [0-80] 4.5±13.2 [0-90] 
SEXUAL BEHAVIORS     
   MEN 9.3±28.3 [0-100] 78.4±40.0 [0-100] 23.7±39.1 [0-100] 52.0±48.7 [0-100] 
   WOMEN 
73.6±43.6 [0-
100] 3.5±17.3 [0-100] 39.1±46.9 [0-80] 26.0±43 [0-100] 
   TRANSGENDER .03±.4 [0-5] .6±7.1 [0-100] 13.0±30.0 [0-100] 3.0±15.4 [0-100] 
HOFFMAN GENDER SCALE     
   TOTAL_FEMALE 1.8±.9 [1-6] 5.0±.7 [1-6] 1.8±1.0 [1-5.6] 3.66±1.76 [1-6] 
   TOTAL_MALE 4.9±.9 [1-6] 1.4±.7 [1-5.9] 4.4±1.0 [1-6] 2.95±1.83 [1-6] 
   SELF-DEFINITION_FEMALE 1.9±.8 [1-6] 4.6±.9 [1-6] 1.6±.9 [1-5.3] 3.41±1.68 [1-6] 
   SELF-DEFINITION_MALE 4.7±1.1 [1-6] 1.5±.6 [1-6] 4.1±1.1 [1-6] 2.84±1.70 [1-6] 
   SELF-
ACCEPTANCE_FEMALE 1.8±1.0 [1-6] 5.4±.7 [1-6] 2.0±1.2 [1-6] 3.90±1.93 [1-6] 
   SELF-ACCEPTANCE_MALE 5.2±.9 [1-6] 1.4±.7 [1-5.7] 4.8±1.1 [1-6] 3.08±2.01 [1-6] 
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 Table 2 
A 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated 
measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Problem gender identity 12.91 1 12.91 61.34 0.00 0.193 
Problem gender identity * Gender 0.58 1 0.58 2.75 0.10 0.011 
Problem gender identity * Standard dual 
process condition 0.22 1 0.22 1.05 0.31 0.004 
Problem gender identity* Magnitude 0.10 1 0.10 0.47 0.50 0.002 
Problem gender identity* Gender  * 
Standard dual process condition 1.06 1 1.06 5.03 0.03 0.019 
Problem gender identity * Gender  * 
Magnitude 0.97 1 0.97 4.59 0.03 0.018 
Problem gender identity * Standard dual 
process condition  * Magnitude 0.02 1 0.02 0.10 0.75 0.000 
Problem gender identity * Gender  * 
Standard dual process condition  * 
Magnitude 0.11 1 0.11 0.51 0.48 0.002 
Error(problem gender identity) 53.89 256 0.21    
Problem natal sex 0.04 1 0.04 0.21 0.65 0.001 
Problem natal sex * Gender 0.59 1 0.59 3.08 0.08 0.012 
Problem natal sex * Standard dual 
process condition 1.04 1 1.04 5.44 0.02 0.021 
Problem natal sex * Magnitude 0.28 1 0.28 1.47 0.23 0.006 
Problem natal sex * Gender  * Standard 
dual process condition 0.38 1 0.38 1.99 0.16 0.008 
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 Problem natal sex * Gender  * 
Magnitude 0.01 1 0.01 0.04 0.84 0.000 
Problem natal sex * standard dual 
process condition  * Magnitude 0.08 1 0.08 0.41 0.53 0.002 
Problem natal sex * Gender  * Standard 
dual process condition  *  Magnitude 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.000 
Error(Problem natal sex) 48.89 256 0.19    
Problem gender identity * Problem natal 
sex 5.93 1 5.93 33.50 0.00 0.116 
Problem gender identity * Problem natal 
sex * Gender 0.05 1 0.05 0.28 0.60 0.001 
Problem gender identity * Problem natal 
sex * standard dual process condition 0.26 1 0.26 1.47 0.23 0.006 
Problem gender identity * Problem natal 
sex * Magnitude 0.32 1 0.32 1.81 0.18 0.007 
Problem gender identity * Problem natal 
sex * Gender  * Standard dual process 
condition 0.04 1 0.04 0.22 0.64 0.001 
Problem gender identity * Problem natal 
sex * Gender  * Magnitude 0.05 1 0.05 0.25 0.62 0.001 
Problem gender identity * Problem natal 
sex * standard dual process condition  *  
Magnitude 0.02 1 0.02 0.12 0.73 0.000 
Gender 0.19 1 0.19 0.78 0.38 0.003 
Standard dual process condition 0.02 1 0.02 0.10 0.75 0.000 
Magnitude 0.76 1 0.76 3.10 0.08 0.012 
Gender * Standard dual process 
condition 0.01 1 0.01 0.05 0.83 0.000 
Gender * Magnitude 0.19 1 0.19 0.76 0.38 0.003 
Standard dual process condition * 
Magnitude 0.49 1 0.49 1.98 0.16 0.008 
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 Gender * Standard dual process 
condition * Magnitude 0.79 1 0.79 3.21 0.07 0.012 
Error 62.61 256 0.25       
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 Table 3 
A 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated 
measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Problem gender identity 324038.03 1 324038.03 72.03 0.00 0.253 
Problem gender identity * Gender 13920.59 1 13920.59 3.10 0.08 0.014 
Problem gender identity * standard dual 
process condition 2929.58 1 2929.58 0.65 0.42 0.003 
Problem gender identity * Magnitude 7192.35 1 7192.35 1.60 0.21 0.007 
Problem gender identity * Gender  *  
standard dual process condition 14500.77 1 14500.77 3.22 0.07 0.015 
Problem gender identity * Gender  *  
Magnitude 10286.89 1 10286.89 2.29 0.13 0.011 
Problem gender identity * standard dual 
process condition  *  Magnitude 0.80 1 0.80 0.00 0.99 0.000 
Problem gender identity * Gender  *  
standard dual process condition  *  
Magnitude 1144.14 1 1144.14 0.25 0.62 0.001 
Error(Problem gender identity) 958162.48 213 4498.42    
Problem natal sex 1243.88 1 1243.88 0.37 0.54 0.002 
Problem natal sex * Gender 3559.39 1 3559.39 1.06 0.30 0.005 
Problem natal sex * standard dual 
process condition 4657.12 1 4657.12 1.39 0.24 0.006 
Problem natal sex * Magnitude 11384.02 1 11384.02 3.40 0.07 0.016 
Problem natal sex * Gender  *  standard 
dual process condition 2890.68 1 2890.68 0.86 0.35 0.004 
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 Problem natal sex * Gender  *  
Magnitude 1481.94 1 1481.94 0.44 0.51 0.002 
Problem natal sex * standard dual 
process condition  *  Magnitude 3280.80 1 3280.80 0.98 0.32 0.005 
Problem natal sex * Gender  *  standard 
dual process condition  *  Magnitude 958.34 1 958.34 0.29 0.59 0.001 
Error(Problem natal sex) 712788.95 213 3346.43    
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex 116271.63 1 116271.63 36.21 0.00 0.145 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex * Gender 291.89 1 291.89 0.09 0.76 0.000 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex * standard dual process 
condition 1587.10 1 1587.10 0.49 0.48 0.002 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex * Magnitude 10050.30 1 10050.30 3.13 0.08 0.014 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex * Gender  *  standard dual 
process condition 3060.56 1 3060.56 0.95 0.33 0.004 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex * Gender  *  Magnitude 10.86 1 10.86 0.00 0.95 0.000 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex * standard dual process 
condition  *  Magnitude 1126.77 1 1126.77 0.35 0.55 0.002 
Gender 5555.93 1 5555.93 1.03 0.31 0.005 
standard dual process condition 2679.88 1 2679.88 0.50 0.48 0.002 
Magnitude 10938.04 1 10938.04 2.03 0.16 0.009 
Gender * standard dual process 
condition 1.62 1 1.62 0.00 0.99 0.000 
Gender * Magnitude 10060.92 1 10060.92 1.87 0.17 0.009 
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 standard dual process condition * 
Magnitude 9489.06 1 9489.06 1.76 0.19 0.008 
Gender * standard dual process 
condition * Magnitude 14159.75 1 14159.75 2.63 0.11 0.012 
Error 1149000.00 213 5395.20       
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 Table 4 
A 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex orientation) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure 
ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Problem gender identity 95.63 1 95.63 457.52 0.00 0.36 
Problem gender identity * Gender 19.25 2 9.62 46.04 0.00 0.10 
Problem gender identity * Gist 0.04 1 0.04 0.17 0.68 0.00 
Problem gender identity * Identity 0.38 1 0.38 1.80 0.18 0.00 
Problem gender identity * Gender  *  
Gist 0.70 2 0.35 1.67 0.19 0.00 
Problem gender identity * Gender  *  
Identity 0.11 2 0.06 0.27 0.76 0.00 
Problem gender identity * Gist  *  
Identity 0.34 1 0.34 1.63 0.20 0.00 
Problem gender identity * Gender  *  
Gist  *  Identity 0.12 2 0.06 0.29 0.75 0.00 
Error(Problem gender identity) 171.60 821 0.21    
Problem natal sex 0.49 1 0.49 3.16 0.08 0.00 
Problem natal sex * Gender 7.14 2 3.57 22.89 0.00 0.05 
Problem natal sex * Gist 0.60 1 0.60 3.81 0.05 0.01 
Problem natal sex * Identity 0.58 1 0.58 3.72 0.05 0.01 
Problem natal sex * Gender  *  Gist 0.12 2 0.06 0.38 0.69 0.00 
Problem natal sex * Gender  *  Identity 0.55 2 0.28 1.77 0.17 0.00 
Problem natal sex * Gist  *  Identity 0.11 1 0.11 0.68 0.41 0.00 
Problem natal sex * Gender  *  Gist  *  
Identity 0.07 2 0.04 0.24 0.79 0.00 
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 Error(Problem natal sex) 128.09 821 0.16    
Problem gender identity* Problem natal 
sex 0.08 1 0.08 0.50 0.48 0.00 
Problem gender identity* Problem natal 
sex * Gender 14.50 2 7.25 43.78 0.00 0.10 
Problem gender identity* Problem natal 
sex * Gist 0.02 1 0.02 0.10 0.75 0.00 
Problem gender identity* Problem natal 
sex * Identity 0.22 1 0.22 1.35 0.25 0.00 
Problem gender identity* Problem natal 
sex * Gender  *  Gist 0.15 2 0.07 0.44 0.65 0.00 
Problem gender identity* Problem natal 
sex * Gender  *  Identity 0.17 2 0.08 0.51 0.60 0.00 
Problem gender identity* Problem natal 
sex * Gist  *  Identity 0.02 1 0.02 0.12 0.73 0.00 
Gender 0.26 2 0.13 0.58 0.56 0.00 
Gist 0.07 1 0.07 0.32 0.57 0.00 
Identity 0.04 1 0.04 0.18 0.67 0.00 
Gender * Gist 0.01 2 0.00 0.02 0.99 0.00 
Gender * Identity 0.54 2 0.27 1.17 0.31 0.00 
Gist * Identity 0.00 1 0.00 0.01 0.93 0.00 
Gender * Gist * Identity 0.29 2 0.14 0.62 0.54 0.00 
Error 188.47 821 0.23       
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 Table 5 
A 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex orientation) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measures 
ANOVA on signed confidence 
 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Problem gender identity 2918289.23 1 2918289.23 602.31 .00 .444 
Problem gender identity * Gender 826848.54 2 413424.27 85.33 .00 .185 
Problem gender identity * Gist 368.79 1 368.79 .08 .78 .000 
Problem gender identity * Identity 4186.18 1 4186.18 .86 .35 .001 
Problem gender identity * Gender  *  
Gist 
26863.99 2 13432.00 2.77 .06 .007 
Problem gender identity * Gender  *  
Identity 
3833.02 2 1916.51 .40 .67 .001 
Problem gender identity * Gist  *  
Identity 
5943.45 1 5943.45 1.23 .27 .002 
Problem gender identity * Gender  *  
Gist  *  Identity 
465.38 2 232.69 .05 .95 .000 
Error(Problem gender identity) 3648383.10 753 4845.13       
Problem natal sex 55350.99 1 55350.99 17.18 .00 .022 
Problem natal sex* Gender 186746.60 2 93373.30 28.97 .00 .071 
Problem natal sex* Gist 16340.59 1 16340.59 5.07 .02 .007 
Problem natal sex* Identity 10023.03 1 10023.03 3.11 .08 .004 
Problem natal sex* Gender  *  Gist 1420.99 2 710.50 .22 .80 .001 
Problem natal sex* Gender  *  Identity 14895.06 2 7447.53 2.31 .10 .006 
Problem natal sex* Gist  *  Identity 1199.14 1 1199.14 .37 .54 .000 
Problem natal sex* Gender  *  Gist  *  
Identity 
1165.03 2 582.52 .18 .83 .000 
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 Error(Problem natal sex) 2426648.87 753 3222.64       
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex 
5669.64 1 5669.64 1.63 .20 .002 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex* Gender 
492825.59 2 246412.80 70.97 .00 .159 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex* Gist 
864.97 1 864.97 .25 .62 .000 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex* Identity 
749.76 1 749.76 .22 .64 .000 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex * Gender  *  Gist 
7540.63 2 3770.31 1.09 .34 .003 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex* Gender  *  Identity 
4246.05 2 2123.03 .61 .54 .002 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex * Gist  *  Identity 
3246.31 1 3246.31 .94 .33 .001 
Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex * Gender  *  Gist  *  Identity 
1371.66 2 685.83 .20 .82 .001 
Error(Problem gender identity * 
Problem natal sex) 
2614328.61 753.00 3471.88 
      
Gender 16679.57 2.00 8339.79 1.65 .19 .004 
Gist 1355.26 1.00 1355.26 .27 .60 .000 
Identity 14.68 1.00 14.68 .00 .96 .000 
Gender * Gist 51.96 2.00 25.98 .01 .99 .000 
Gender * Identity 6400.38 2.00 3200.19 .63 .53 .002 
Gist * Identity 710.55 1.00 710.55 .14 .71 .000 
Gender * Gist * Identity 7703.01 2.00 3851.50 .76 .47 .002 
Error 3799430.187 753 5045.72       
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 Table 6 
A 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex orientation) x 3(gender) x 3(randomization) repeated measures ANOVA on 
identity preserving choice 
 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Problem gender identity 31.00 1 31.00 131.01 .00 .174 
Problem gender identity * Gender .07 1 .07 .28 .60 .000 
Problem gender identity * Randomization .55 2 .27 1.16 .31 .004 
Problem gender identity * Gender  *  
Randomization 
1.27 2 .64 2.69 .07 .009 
Error(Problem gender identity) 147.64 624 .24       
Problem natal sex .98 1 .98 5.66 .02 .009 
Problem natal sex * Gender 1.11 1 1.11 6.40 .01 .010 
Problem natal sex * Randomization .59 2 .30 1.71 .18 .005 
Problem natal sex * Gender  *  
Randomization 
.00 2 .00 .00 1.00 .000 
Error(Problem natal sex) 108.14 624 .17       
Problem gender identity * Problem natal sex 5.99 1 5.99 33.06 .00 .050 
Problem gender identity * Problem natal sex 
* Gender 
.50 1 .50 2.75 .10 .004 
Problem gender identity * Problem natal sex 
* Randomization 
.30 2 .15 .81 .44 .003 
Problem gender identity * Problem natal sex 
* Gender  *  Randomization 
.05 2 .03 .14 .87 .000 
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 Error(Problem gender identity * Problem 
natal sex) 
113.13 624 .18 
      
Intercept 547.65 1 547.65 2079.09 .00 .769 
Gender .00 1 .00 .01 .92 .000 
Randomization .94 2 .47 1.78 .17 .006 
Gender * Randomization .78 2 .39 1.48 .23 .005 
Error 164.37 624 .26       
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 Table 7 
Means by gender group and decision problem for each value rating 
 
 Prostate Cancer Breast Cancer 
  transgender male female transgender male female 
1. surviving cancer 8.70 9.03 9.31 8.95 9.15 9.38 
2. living in the wrong body for your gender 
identity 7.28 5.85 5.69 7.97 5.96 5.69 
3. uncomfortable in the warmer seasons 4.53 4.52 4.28 5.39 4.75 4.70 
4. enlarged breasts 5.29 5.71 5.29 4.85 5.33 4.57 
5. surgical risks (e.g., blood loss, surgical site 
infection, anesthesia-related death) 5.30 7.08 7.58 5.16 6.76 7.31 
6. pain 4.82 5.99 6.77 4.56 5.61 6.69 
7. being able to hide your breasts if you are 
male 7.16 6.22 5.75 7.53 6.34 5.06 
8. conserving the breast 1.72 4.12 4.17 1.87 5.25 6.55 
9. disability 5.55 7.04 7.15 5.68 7.40 7.28 
10. having a flat chest if you see yourself as 
male 7.42 6.25 5.68 8.50 6.09 5.00 
11. conserving erectile function 5.78 7.65 6.72 4.84 7.21 5.00 
12. cancer recurrence 8.40 8.52 9.10 8.29 8.72 8.98 
13. my identity as male, or as a man 7.91 7.70 6.67 7.97 7.38 4.14 
14. my identity as female, or as a woman 1.81 3.63 5.07 2.29 4.26 7.90 
 
Note. Values were rated on a 10-point Likert scale from 1 = Least important and 10 = Most important. 
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 Table 7 (cont) 
Means by gender group and decision problem for each value rating 
 
 Gynecomastia Gender Transition 
  transgender male female transgender male female 
1. surviving cancer 7.23 8.01 7.63 6.11 7.29 6.41 
2. living in the wrong body for your gender 
identity 8.23 6.14 6.21 8.89 6.86 7.88 
3. uncomfortable in the warmer seasons 5.80 5.12 5.43 5.93 4.80 5.23 
4. enlarged breasts 5.66 5.88 5.81 5.04 5.29 5.24 
5. surgical risks (e.g., blood loss, surgical site 
infection, anesthesia-related death) 5.25 7.02 7.62 5.00 6.90 7.61 
6. pain 4.92 5.94 6.74 4.43 5.98 6.69 
7. being able to hide your breasts if you are 
male 8.38 6.76 6.94 8.48 6.40 6.39 
8. conserving the breast 1.73 4.22 4.33 1.71 4.36 4.14 
9. disability 5.27 6.81 6.82 4.79 6.67 6.42 
10. having a flat chest if you see yourself as 
male 8.82 7.04 6.91 8.95 6.91 7.10 
11. conserving erectile function 4.69 6.90 5.28 3.93 6.17 4.44 
12. cancer recurrence 6.89 7.47 7.39 5.82 7.01 6.17 
13. my identity as male, or as a man 8.48 7.76 7.10 8.98 7.83 7.28 
14. my identity as female, or as a woman 1.93 3.52 5.30 2.00 4.03 5.54 
 
Note. Values were rated on a 10-point Likert scale from 1 = Least important and 10 = Most important. 
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 Table 8 
A 4(decision problem) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on value rating 
 
Source SS df MS F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Surgical Risk Value Rating 
gender 1940.82 2 970.41 49.56 .000 .123 
problem * gender 16.82 6 2.80 2.19 .04 .006 
problem * gender * gist 17.81 6 2.97 2.32 .03 .007 
Error 13864.32 708 19.58       
Conserving the Breast Value Rating 
gender 3187.79 2 1593.90 85.31 .000 .199 
problem 424.97 3 141.66 41.69 .000 .057 
problem * gender 339.53 6 56.59 16.66 .000 .046 
Error 12836.41 687 18.69    
Cancer Recurrence Value Rating 
gender 131.90 2 65.95 4.07 .02 .012 
problem 2006.23 3 668.75 136.61 .000 .168 
problem * gender 64.34 6 10.72 2.19 .04 .006 
gist prime * identity prime 61.52 1 61.52 3.80 .05 .006 
problem * gist prime * identity prime 110.79 3 36.93 7.54 .000 .011 
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 Error       
Conserving Erectile Function Value Rating 
gender 1164.72 2 582.36 24.09 .000 .066 
problem 849.86 3 283.29 77.84 .000 .103 
problem * gender 72.86 6 12.14 3.34 .003 .010 
gist prime * gender 170.27 2 85.13 3.52 .03 .010 
gist prime * identity prime 104.36 1 104.36 4.32 .04   .006 
problem * gist prime * identity prime 35.19 3 11.73 3.22 .02 .005 
problem * gender * gist prime * identity 
prime 
50.22 6 8.37 3.00 .03   .007 
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 Table 9 
Correlations table of value ratings and choice across the four decision problems 
  Breast Cancer Prostate Cancer 
1. surviving cancer -.150** -.148** 
2. living in the wrong body for your gender identity -.159** .103** 
3. uncomfortable in the warmer seasons -0.046 .078* 
4. enlarged breasts .086* .117** 
5. surgical risks (e.g., blood loss, surgical site 
infection, anesthesia-related death) .143** -0.036 
6. pain 
.126** -0.035 
7. being able to hide your breasts if you are male -.118** .142** 
8. conserving the breast .616** -0.071 
9. disability .096** -0.032 
10. having a flat chest if you see yourself as male -.222** .175** 
11. conserving erectile function .113** 0.049 
12. cancer recurrence -.236** -.142** 
13. my identity as male, or as a man -.125** .122** 
14. my identity as female, or as a woman .277** -0.038 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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 Table 9 (cont) 
Correlations table of value ratings and choice across the four decision problems 
  Gynecomastia Gender Transition 
1. surviving cancer 0.006 -0.056 
2. living in the wrong body for your gender identity .157** .293** 
3. uncomfortable in the warmer seasons .100** .137** 
4. enlarged breasts .090* 0.069 
5. surgical risks (e.g., blood loss, surgical site 
infection, anesthesia-related death) -.263** -.294** 
6. pain 
-.120** -.133** 
7. being able to hide your breasts if you are male .269** .260** 
8. conserving the breast -.152** -.211** 
9. disability -.112** -.127** 
10. having a flat chest if you see yourself as male .308** .316** 
11. conserving erectile function 0.043 0.01 
12. cancer recurrence -0.047 -.074* 
13. my identity as male, or as a man .252** .265** 
14. my identity as female, or as a woman -.138** -.168** 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Figure 1. Main effect of problem gender orientation from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 
2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
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Figure 2. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by standard dual process condition from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem 
natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
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Figure 3. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by problem gender orientation from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem 
natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
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Figure 4. Interaction effect of problem gender orientation by participant gender by standard dual process condition from a 2(problem 
gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure 
ANOVA on identity preserving choice
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Figure 5. Interaction effect of problem gender orientation by participant gender by standard dual process magnitude from a 2(problem 
gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure 
ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
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Figure 6. Main effect of problem gender orientation from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(magnitude) x 
2(standard dual process condition) x 2(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
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Figure 7. Main effect of problem gender orientation from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 
2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
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Figure 8. Interaction effect of problem gender orientation by participant gender from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem 
natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
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Figure 9. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by participant gender from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 
2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
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Figure 10. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by gist prime from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist 
prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice 
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Figure 11. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by identity prime from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 
2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving choice
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Figure 12. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by problem gender orientation by participant gender from a 2(problem gender 
orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on identity preserving 
choice 
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Figure 13. Main effect of problem gender orientation from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 
2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
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Figure 14. Main effect of problem natal sex from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity 
prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
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Figure 15. Interaction effect of problem gender orientation by participant gender from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem 
natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
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Figure 16. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by participant gender from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 
2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
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Figure 17. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by gist prime from a 2(problem gender orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist 
prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
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Figure 18. Interaction effect of problem natal sex by problem gender orientation by participant gender from a 2(problem gender 
orientation) x 2(problem natal sex) x 2(gist prime) x 2(identity prime) x 3(gender) repeated measure ANOVA on signed confidence 
